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Abstract
Constitutionalism is an Anishinaabe legal tradition. This thesis explores modern
Anishinaabe constitutions in Ontario, as they connect to traditional constitutionalism while
meeting the unique governing needs of contemporary Anishinaabe First Nations communities. I
address the scholarly and legal context in which these constitutional documents have been
produced and shed an empirical light on these understudied legal instruments. Two questions
shape this thesis: 1) what are the defining characteristics of Anishinaabe constitutions in Ontario;
and, 2) what is their function within Anishinaabe communities? To answer these questions, I
review both ratified and draft Anishinaabe constitutional documents of member communities of
the Anishinabek Nation according to three elements of constitutional development: culture,
power, and justice. I find that these constitutions, though comparable to Western constitutions,
are distinctly Anishinaabe legal instruments that respond to the settler-colonial state while
prioritizing the restoration of Anishinaabe law-making powers and jurisdiction. Modern,
positivist Anishinaabe constitutions in Ontario seek to nourish Anishinaabe ways of living as
they look toward the past, present, and future needs of the communities that produce them. I
conclude that, whatever the state of current scholarly discussions on the theoretical compatibility
of Indigenous law with state law, these constitutions exist as a form of practical selfempowerment.

Keywords
Anishinaabe, Anishinabek Nation, Indigenous, Aboriginal, Anishinaabe law, traditional law,
self-determination, self-governance, constitutions, way of living
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Summary for Lay Audience
Constitutionalism can be understood as an adherence to basic standards and principles
that align with an overarching standard of ethics. In a more formal sense, it is the written or
unwritten fundamental legal framework of a nation. It functions to empower and constrain
government while outlining the basic principles by which the named government is expected to
conduct itself. Its scope expands from governmental duties and relations with external
governments to the most fundamental rights and protections of citizens.
A number of Anishinaabe First Nations communities throughout Ontario have written
and begun using constitution style documents that contain some similarities to the Canadian
constitution, as well as many unique points that come from Anishinaabe tradition. These
constitutions contain both rules about how local government must be formed and guiding
principles on how people should aspire to live. For the most part, they are part of an effort to
create stability in advance of what many people hope is an agreement between the communities
(in the form of the political advocacy organization, Anishinabek Nation) and the Canadian
federal government that would allow these First Nations communities to exercise more control
over their operation. Based on these points, Anishinaabe constitutions in Ontario can be
understood as important documents. They are important documents. Even so, they are missing
from academic conversations on how Indigenous laws and governance are growing today.
The purpose of this paper is to draw attention to Anishinaabe constitutions – what they
have in common and what their role is in the operation of governance in the communities that
have them. To examine these points, I first explain how Indigenous law might be understood,
especially because people who are not from Indigenous communities are used to recognizing in
the form that we see the most – how the government produces law. I then provide information on
how Indigenous law has been undermined in the context of Canadian law. I move on to explain
how constitutions – something that non-Indigenous people are used to thinking of as related to
Western or European law – is actually also an Anishinaabe legal tradition. It is Indigenous law as
much as what was discussed in the previous section. The next part of the thesis is an analysis of
Anishinaabe constitutions to reveal how different communities approach issues in a way that is
recognizable to outsiders, but which makes space for the use of Anishinaabe law. I conclude that
Anishinaabe constitutions are important for governance and the empowerment of communities,
even if their future power against interference by the Canadian government remains unclear.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
“We continue to occupy a physical and jurisprudential world that is made up of intermixed
layers of ancient and recent origin. The interdependence of these elements for the diversity of life
on the land cannot be over-emphasized. To look just on the surface, and think that what you see
from the horizon to horizon is all that is needed to survive, is to misunderstand your place on the
ground which you stand. To scale its heights – to learn its lessons – one must be alive to the
underlying structures that support the visible and not-so-visible world around you.”
- John Borrows, Drawing Out Law, 2010 1

1.1 Introduction
There has been a recent proliferation of written Anishinaabe2 constitutions among First
Nations member communities of the Anishinabek Nation3 in Ontario, connected to the
organization’s mission to restore Anishinaabeg jurisdiction and rebuild traditional governance.4
Written constitutions are a requirement for the exercise of Anishinaabeg jurisdiction as outlined
in the Anishinabek Nation Governance Agreement (“ANGA”)5 – a central component of the

John Borrows, Drawing Out Law: A Spirit’s Guide (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010) at 72. [Drawing
Out Law]
2
The Anishinaabeg – the Ojibwe, Odawa, and Bodewadmi - lived in a clan-based legal structure around the western
Great Lakes area since long before the arrival of European outsiders. These three nations, known as the Three Fires
Confederacy (or the People of the Three Fires) established and maintained a complex system of law founded on
kinship relations that managed domestic relations, property rights, and criminal law, among other areas of law. See:
James A. Clifton et al, People of the Three Fires: The Ottawa, Potawatomi, and Ojibway of Michigan (Michigan:
Grand Rapids Inter-Tribal Council, 1986) at 12. For a robust explanation of clan-based governance, see: Heidi
Rosemary Bohaker, Nindoodemag: Anishinaabe Identities in the Eastern Great Lakes Region, 1600-1900 (PhD
Dissertation, University of Toronto, 2006).
3
The Anishinabek Nation (established as the Union of Ontario Indians) founded in 1949 for the purpose of political
advocacy on behalf of Anishinaabeg communities, which lacked collective legal recognition for the purpose of
entering into legally-binding agreements. The organization consists of 39 First Nations across Ontario and is
charged with delivering programs and services (including, but not limited to: economic development, health, social
development, and labour and market relations) to member communities. A primary goal of the Anishinabek Nation
is to reinforce the existence of the Anshinaabek nation and to encourage unity among member Anishinaabeg First
Nations. For more details on the Anishinabek Nation and its mandate, see: Anishinabek Nation, “Anishinabek
Nation”, Anishinabek Nation (2019), online: < https://www.anishinabek.ca/who-we-are-and-what-we-do/>.
4
Anishinabek Nation, “Wii-Bskaadoodoong Maanda Eko-Kowaabjigaade Gimaawinan Dbaakgonigewin:
Restoration of Jurisdiction”, Anishinabek Nation (2019), online:
<https://www.anishinabek.ca/governance/governanceactivities/overview/>. [“Restoration of Jurisdiction”]
5
The final draft of the ANGA was signed on August 23, 2019, drawing an end to almost 25 years of negotiations.
The ratification vote among First Nations members of the Anishinabek Nation was scheduled for early 2020, but has
1

2
project of jurisdictional restoration. These constitutions, produced and ratified by First Nations
members of the Anishinabek Nation, are the primary tool for participating communities to
exercise their own (i.e. not derived from the Indian Act) law-making authority and jurisdiction
while striving toward stability and transparency in local governance.6 These constitutions are
also the extension of traditional Anishinaabe law.
Chi-inaakonigewin,7 the term often used to embody the Anishinaabe constitutional
tradition, is a verb in Anishinaabemowin.8 Anishinaabe constitutionalism is thus best understood
in terms of action. It was and is based on action in relationships.9 Seen in this light,
constitutionalism becomes an expression of something deeper than abstract governance.
Constitutionalism describes how people belong to one another. 10 For the Anishinaabe,
Belonging to one another has been an exercise in diversity and local decision making, with an
attentiveness to individual autonomy.11 As an extension of this legal paradigm, Anishinaabe
constitutions are part of a movement toward the revitalization of Indigenous law that embraces a
renewed focus on relationality.

been postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. More information on the ANGA will be provided in Chapter 4. A
‘plain language’ version of the ANGA is available from the Anishinabek Nation. See: Anishinabek Nation,
“Proposed Ansihinabek Nation Governance Agreement: Plain Language Version”, Anishinabek Governance
Agreement (2020), online: < https://www.governancevote.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/AN-Governance-PlainLanguage.pdf>.
6
Anishinabek Nation, “Restoration of Jurisdiction”, supra note 4.
7
‘Chi’ can be translated to great or large, while ‘inaakonige’ means to “act through making a judgement or deciding
to proceed in a certain way.” See John Borrows, Review: Chippewas of the Thames First Nation Draft Constitution
(June 2014) at 2, online: <https://cottfn.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Chippewa-Thames-Constitution-Review.pdf>. This term is included, with some spelling variation, in the titles of the majority of constitutional documents
reviewed for this thesis.
8
Ibid. Anishinaabemowin is the Ojibwe language. Spellings vary depending on the person, community, and region.
Readers will notice spelling variations throughout this paper, in keeping with original sources.
9
John Borrows, “Indigenous Constitutionalism: Pre-existing Legal Genealogies in Canada”, in Peter Oliver, Patrick
Macklem, and Nathalie Des Rosiers, eds, Oxford Handbook of the Canadian Constitution (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2017) at 26. [“Indigenous Constitutionalism”]
10
Aaron Mills (Waabishki Ma’iingan), Miinigowiziwin: All That Has Been Given for Living Well Together: One
Vision of Anishinaabe Constitutionalism (PhD Thesis, University of Victoria, 2019) at 28. [unpublished]
[Miinigowiziwin]
11
John Borrows, “Indigenous Constitutionalism”, supra note 9 at 27-28.
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The revitalization of in Indigenous law in Canada is part a wider movement toward the
revitalization of language, culture (including their relationship with the land), and Indigenous
food security. This is more than a revitalization of abstract concepts – this is a revitalization of
life. It is from this vantage point that we can best understand modern Anishinaabe12 constitutions
in Ontario. After all, constitutions are more than a written body of principles, rights, and
governmental limitations – they are “a way of living.”13 Modern Anishinaabe constitutions in
Ontario provide insight into Anishinaabe life in the past, present, and future. The themes found
in these constitutions – language rights, connections to ecology, the rights of communities to
define their own citizenship, the assertion of law-making rights - are the same themes of
exploration that characterize the general study of Indigenous legal orders in Canada. And yet,
despite increasingly robust scholarship on the revitalization of Indigenous legal orders,
Anishinaabe constitutions have been overlooked in academic literature.14
This thesis explores how written Anishinaabe constitutions fit within the greater tradition
of Anishinaabe constitutionalism. In doing so, this paper builds upon the work of Anishinaabe
constitutional scholars like John Borrows and Aaron Mills, who present their understandings of
Anishinaabe law and constitutionalism. The core objective of this thesis, rather than build on the
theoretical underpinnings of Anishinaabe constitutionalism, is to shed some empirical light15
onto the ways in which Anishinaabe communities in Ontario are utilizing constitutional

12

The Anishinaabe have a strong historical presence in the Great Lakes area. Traditional Anishinaabe territory is
north of Lakes Ontario and Erie, and extends across the other Great Laws into the southern woodlands and Canadian
prairies. See John Borrows, “Indigenous Constitutionalism”, supra note 9 at 26.
13
See John Borrows, Review: Chippewas of the Thames First Nation Draft Constitution, supra note 7 at 1, online:
<https://cottfn.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Chippewa-Thames-Constitution-Review-.pdf>.
14
This is a curiosity that Christopher Alcantara and Greg Whitfield remark on in their stand-alone study of fourteen
Indigenous constitutions on Canada’s west coast, published in 2010. See Christopher Alcantara and Greg Whitfield,
“Aboriginal Self-Government through Constitutional Design: A Survey of Fourteen Aboriginal Constitutions in
Canada” (2010) 44:2 J of Canadian Stud 122. [“Aboriginal Self-Government through Constitutional Design”]
15
This objective (and its wording) echoes that in Christopher Alcantara and Greg Whitfield, ibid at 124.

4
development as a means of managing issues of self-determination and legal revitalization in a
context where Indigenous legal traditions are held by the settler-colonial state to be subordinate.
The subjects of this study are ten Anishinaabe constitutions ratified in Ontario and five unratified
constitutional documents, which together serve as informative examples of constitutional thought
and development among member communities of the Anishinabek Nation.
The research questions investigated in this thesis are: 1) what are the defining
characteristics of Anishinaabe constitutions in Ontario; and, 2) what is their function within
Anishinaabe communities? My approach to answering these questions is descriptive and analytic,
as I compare the form and contents of the constitutions studied. Among matters of consideration
are how and to what extent distinctive Anishinaabe culture is expressed within the documents,
what sources of power are asserted as the foundation for Anishinaabe self-determination or selfgovernance, and to what extent these documents draw from traditional law. A comparison of
Anishinaabe constitutions reveals common priorities among member communities of the
Anishinabek Nation as they contemplate self-determination.
An analysis of these documents reveals a drive among Anishinaabe communities in
Ontario toward democratic self-governance that honours traditional law and the right of citizens
to Anishinaabe language and culture, while meeting growing challenges, such as economic
growth. Through this approach, I demonstrate that, whatever the answers are to the ongoing
theoretical debates about the incommensurability of Indigenous law with state law, a significant
number of Anishinaabeg First Nation communities in Ontario are endeavouring to use
democratic constitutions that reflect Western constitutions (to some degree) as a means of
communicating and protecting traditional Anishinaabe law and empower local government.16

16

There are a number of Anishinaabe constitutions produced by communities in the USA. A comparison is outside
the boundaries of this thesis, which is an analysis of Anishinaabe constitutions in Ontario only.
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(And, significantly, that they are doing so with great stakes on the horizon of the ratification
process of a self-governance agreement nearly 25 years in the making.) This thesis is one step to
filling an academic gap and gaining a better understanding of the state of Anishinaabe
constitutionalism in Ontario – an effort that I will continue in my doctoral studies.

1.2 Outline
One must understand the state of Indigenous legal thought in academia to appreciate the
context of this constitutional review. For this reason, Chapter 2 explores Indigenous legal
scholarship in Canada. I first focus on how Indigenous scholars have wrestled with the
relationship between the revitalization of Indigenous legal orders and making improvements in
the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Crown. Next, I review the state of the
academic discussion on Indigenous constitutionalism in Canada – an exercise that reveals the
conspicuous gap into which Indigenous constitutions have fallen in Canadian legal scholarship.
Chapter 3 provides greater depth to this conversation with an evaluation of Indigenous
legal orders as resilient in the face of state oppression. In this chapter, we review how Indigenous
law has persisted in the settler-colonial context despite a lack of recognition by the state. If we
accept that achieving state recognition of Indigenous legal orders is a desire among some First
Nations communities endeavouring to revive their own law, then we must consider means of
recognition as they arise. This strikes at the heart of the reason for this study of Anishinaabe
constitutions in Ontario – not to evaluate the efficacy of these legal instruments, but rather to
evaluate them on their own terms. I go on in this chapter to explore Indigenous legal thought as
distinct from the legal traditions of a Eurocentric society. The purpose of doing so is to set the
foundation for a discussion of Anishinaabe constitutionalism as an Indigenous legal tradition.

6
Chapter 4 is the beating heart of this thesis. It is also the longest chapter. Anishinaabe
constitutionalism becomes our sole focus as we consider how constitutionalism functions as an
Anishinaabe legal tradition. This discussion relies on the work of Aaron Mills, who provides us
with his understanding of how Anishinaabe constitutionalism differs from liberal constitutional
traditions. Through Mills’ framework of rooted Anishinaabe constitutionalism, we can begin to
grasp constitutionalism as an extension of kinship. Constitutionalism becomes action in this
light, as ways of belonging to one another rather than a series of abstract structures.
The next component of this chapter introduces Anishinaabe constitutionalism in one of
the forms it now embodies: modern written Anishinaabe constitutions. These constitutions,
promoted as self-governance documents by the Anishinabek, have been widely pursued by
Anishinaabe communities in Ontario. Though they are associated with a push toward to
conclusion of a governance agreement between the Anishinabek Nation and the federal
government, modern constitutions also exist outside of the context of a governance agreement
that has yet to be agreed to by constitution-ratifying communities.
We then move toward an empirical analysis of ten Anishinaabe constitutions ratified by
First Nations in Ontario. This empirical analysis illustrates the common elements of these legal
instruments. Using three primary constitutional elements (culture, power, and justice), I show
how modern Anishinaabe constitutions manifest Anishinaabe law while demonstrating a high
level of constitutional cohesion. The differences between modern Anishinaabe constitutions,
which have been guided in part by the Anishinabek Nation, reduce more to the absence of
components in some documents rather than the presence of stark contrasts.
My conclusions are presented in Chapter 5. Having shined an empirical light on modern
Anishinaabe constitutions in Ontario, I conclude that they are distinctly Anishinaabe legal

7
instruments, while they also contain elements that reflect Western constitutions (and,
specifically, the Canadian constitution). Though they maintain a similar form, they are also
nuanced in their differences. Above all, they prioritize Anishinaabe law and the nourishment of
Anishinaabe life as the ratifying communities look toward the future. They seek to address the
contemporary issues faced by Anishinaabe First Nations communities in Ontario while working
from a foundation of relations. Much about their future is to be determined with the potential
ratification of the ANGA and the ways that ratifying communities continue to live the principles
within their constitutions. One thing is certain - they are expressions of ways of belonging to one
another and are part of a long tradition of Anishinaabe constitutionalism. As such, they are
deserving of continued study.

1.3 Methodology
There is no pure scholarly objectivity. Some readers will accept this statement; others
will find it controversial. We debate as legal scholars the merits of politicizing our work. We
struggle between notions of legal advocacy and objective realities as the foundation of legal
studies. It is useful during these moments to step back from such debates to contemplate the
nature of knowledge and experience themselves. As Paulo Friere explains:
[O]ne cannot conceive of objectivity without subjectivity. Neither can
exist without the other, nor can they be dichotomized. The separation of
objectivity from subjectivity, the denial of the latter when analyzing reality
or acting upon it, is objectivism. On the other hand, the denial of
objectivity in analysis or action, resulting in a subjectivism which leads to
solipsistic positions, denies action itself by denying objective reality.
Neither objectivism nor subjectivism, nor yet psychologism is propounded
here, but rather subjectivity and objectivity in constant dialectical
relationship...17

17

Paulo Friere, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 30th ed (New York: Continuum, 2005) at 50.

8
To be blunt: there is no world without people and there are no people without the world.18 Our
relationships with our subjects of study are not pristine but are rather muddied with human
complexities. The reality of the dialectical relationship between subjectivity and objectivity
stands in contradiction to dominant academic culture that holds that “the personal contaminates
the search for meaning” and that the distance creates more reliable results.19
Who we are (and who we think we are) colours our interactions with the people and
phenomena we study. It is important to be as aware as possible of these colourations and the
stains they might leave behind once our ink has dried. Linda Tuhiwai Smith reminds scholars
that the way we interact with our subjects of study – and, indeed, knowledge itself – exists within
histories and present moments, which we need to take into account:
… it is surely difficult to discuss research methodologies and indigenous
peoples together, in the same breath, without having an analysis of
imperialism, without understanding the complex ways in which the pursuit
of knowledge is deeply embedded in the multiple layers of imperial and
colonial practices.20
The misappropriation of Indigenous knowledge by way of clumsy or purposeful colonial
research practices is as foundational an issue to sovereignty as it is to race relations and rights
violations.21
Linda Tuhiwai Smith points to anthropology as a classic example of a Western discipline
implicated in imperialism. Anthropologists long framed the study of Indigenous peoples as
“their” science, thereby attempting to legitimize antagonistic and dehumanizing myths about

18

Ibid.
Sarah Morales, "Locating Oneself in One's Research: Learning and Engaging with Law in the Coast Salish
World" (2018) 30:1 CJWL 144 at 165.
20
Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples (New York: Zed Books,
1999) at 2. (Original emphasis.)
21
Aroha Te Pareake Mead, “Misappropriation of Indigenous Knowledge: The Next Wave of Colonisation” (1994)
3:1 Otago Bioethics Report 4 at 4.
19

9
Indigenous peoples.22 Colonial studies of Indigenous peoples create an image of the “other”,
caricatured as extreme versions of idealized or demonized beings. Tropes of Indigenous peoples
as ‘noble savages’ (innately pure, corrupted only by the influence European civilization), as
infantile and unintelligent, as violent, or as altogether vanishing remain prominent in Western
academia and culture.23 These tropes perform an important colonial function: to undermine the
subjectivity, humanness, and sovereignty of Indigenous peoples in favour of the settler colonial
project. The underlying assumption has been that Indigenous peoples were incapable of “[using]
their minds or intellects” and were thus impossible participants in Western academia.24 The
“othering” of Indigenous peoples as subjects of scholarship continues to exclude Indigenous
persons as participants of scholarship and reinforces the asymmetrical power relationship
between Indigenous peoples and the academy (and, by extension, the state).25 The academy has
flattened images Indigenous peoples as subjects of studies while simultaneously seeking to
exclude Indigenous peoples from academia itself.26
We can extend this discussion to the realm of law, for tropes backed by colonial
scholarship practices have informed and continue to reinforce the paternalistic relationship

22

Tuhiwai Smith at 11.
For further explanation, see: Lesley Wylie, Colonial Tropes and Postcolonial Tricks: Rewriting the Tropics in the
novela de la selva (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2009); S.E. Bird, “Introduction: Constructing the Indian,
1830s-1990s” in S.E. Bird, ed, Dressing in Feathers: The Construction of the Indian in American Popular Culture
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press) at 1-12; and Frances V. Rains, “Indigenous Knowledge, Historical Amnesia and
Intellectual Authority: Deconstructing Hegemony and the Social and Political Implications of the Curricula ‘Other’”
in Ladislaus M. Semali and Joe L. Kincheloe, eds, What is Indigenous Knowledge?: Voices From the Academy
(New York: Falmer Press, 1999) at 317-332.
24
Linda Tuhiwai Smith, supra note 20 at 25.
25
For a discussion of this continued process of “othering” and exclusion as it is built into scholarship and university
policies, see Shawn Wilson, Research is Ceremony: Indigenous Research Methods (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing,
2008).
26
For a deeper understanding of how Indigenous peoples are systemically excluded from academia, see: Heather
Castleden, et al., “‘I Don't Think that Any Peer Review Committee . . . Would Ever ‘Get’ What I Currently Do’:
How Institutional Metrics for Success and Merit Risk Perpetuating the (Re)production of Colonial Relationships in
Community-Based Participatory Research Involving Indigenous Peoples in Canada” (2015) 6:4 IIPJ art 2; Martha L.
Stiegman and Heather Castleden, “Leashes and Lies: Navigating the Colonial Tensions of Institutional Ethics of
Research Involving Indigenous Peoples in Canada” (2015) 6:3 IIPJ art 2.
23
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between the Crown and Indigenous peoples. Law as we know it was transported to Canada from
Britain as a tool of colonization. The foundation of our legal system is designed to erase
Indigenous sovereignty in order to fortify that of the Crown. This erasure moves beyond concrete
oppressive actions to a more insidious denial of Indigenous lifeways and jurisgenerative powers.
Indigenous law is characterized as less than, as unrefined, undefined non-law. Eurocentric
Canadian culture seeks to define the conceptual boundaries of law to the exclusion of Indigenous
paradigms. At the same time, Indigenous communities are forced to rely on the legal system that
is also a source of oppression. Albert Memmi encapsulates this impasse:
Whenever the colonizer states, in his language, that the colonized is a
weakling, he suggests thereby that this deficiency requires protection.
From this comes the concept of a protectorate. It is in the colonized's
own interest that he be excluded from management functions, and that
those heavy responsibilities be reserved for the colonizer. Whenever the
colonizer adds, in order not to fall prey to anxiety, that the colonized is
a wicked, backward person with evil, thievish, somewhat sadistic
instincts, he thus justifies his police and his legitimate severity. After
all, he must defend himself against the dangerous foolish acts of the
irresponsible, and at the same time-what meritorious concern!-protect
him against himself! It is the same for the colonized's lack of desires,
his ineptitude for comfort, science, progress, his astonishing familiarity
with poverty.27
Memmi demonstrates how tropes about Indigenous peoples, long promoted in academia and
popular culture alike, reinforce the hold of a paternalistic relationship in law. A relatively recent
movement of Indigenous legal scholars seeks to counter this caricaturizing erasure and to
revitalize Indigenous legal orders from both outside and within the academy. At the same time,

27

Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized (London: Souvenir Press, 1974) at 125-126.
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discussions of decolonizing28 methodology29 have become a natural and popular phenomenon in
academia.
So, what does this have to do with methodology? If methodology is, as Indigenous
scholar Shawn Wilson says, “how you are going to use your ways of thinking… to gain more
knowledge about your reality”30 – the answer is everything. Methodology is “about a process
related to a worldview”.31 It is thus important that I identify myself as a white settler scholar
studying an Indigenous legal topic. My relationship to this topic is that of an outsider who has
had the great privilege of learning from those who have been willing to teach me, primarily at
Deshkan Ziibiing (Chippewas of the Thames First Nation, near London, Ontario). It was during
an internship placement with their Community Justice Department, passionately led by Brenda
Young, that I became immersed in community law and developed an interest in Anishinaabe
constitutionalism. I have grown immensely during my legal education, but never so much as in
the context of Indigenous legal education. I will always take every opportunity that I am offered
to attend, learn, and listen.
As much as I am aware of the discourse of decolonization as a settler Canadian scholar, I
believe that we settlers must be careful not to assume that our relatively newfound selfawareness compensates for what Arlo Kempf, a sociologist of education, describes as “various
layers of latent racism”, “full-scale misunderstanding[s]”, and “overly dismissive attitude[s]”

Franz Fanon tells us that decolonizing one’s mind is the first (but not the only) step to overthrowing colonial
regimes. Franz Fanon defines decolonization as a “program of complete disorder” that “sets out to change the order
of the world”. It is “a historical process: that is to say it cannot be understood, it cannot become intelligible nor clear
to itself except in the exact measure that we can discern the movements which give it historical form and content”.
See Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1963) at 36.
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towards oppression.32 Too often, the language of decolonization is propounded in academia and
among social justice projects without taking time to consider what the work of decolonization
means. Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang lament the adoption of decolonization as a metaphor for
social improvement within the academy and society at large:
There is a long and bumbled history of non-Indigenous peoples making
moves to alleviate the impacts of colonization. The too-easy adoption of
decolonizing discourse (making decolonization a metaphor) is just one part
of that history and it taps into pre-existing tropes that get in the way of
more meaningful potential alliances.33
This easy adoption of the language of decolonization by settlers may be a move to innocence34
that seeks to “reconcile settler guilt and complicity, and rescue settler futurity”35 and “ultimately
represent settler fantasies of easier paths to reconciliation.”36 It can be argued that this is what
liberal settlers contributing to the colonial project do best: provide “kindhearted, palliative care
for a lost people.”37 Used in this way, the language of decolonization becomes as hollow as
popularized calls for reconciliation38 in Canada. We must remember that decolonization is, at its
heart, answerable only to Indigenous sovereignty and futurity.39
I am, for all of my efforts, studies, and relationships, not immune to the settler follies
described by Arlo Kempf. It is with these follies and an awareness of their potential harm that I
approach the study of Indigenous law. As such, my study of Anishinaabe constitutions is an
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exercise in learning and it is my hope that its effect is a contribution in solidarity. I do not
attempt to tell Indigenous stories or interpret Indigenous legal traditions. I rely on Indigenous
legal scholars to describe meaning and assess legal value. My approach to Anishinaabe
constitutions is descriptive and designed to call attention to them as an important continuance of
Anishinaabe constitutionalism that aspires to meet communities where they are in the present,
while looking toward both their past and futures.
My aim in this study is to present Anishinaabe constitutions as understudied significant
legal instruments in Ontario, given that the Anishinabek Nation and individual communities have
widely promoted their potential value to self-determination and self-governance. My hope is that
the information and sources within this thesis contribute to burgeoning discussions of what selfdetermination means in a context where Canadian constitutionalism frames Indigenous rights.
On solidarity between the oppressor and the oppressed, Paulo Friere writes:
The oppressor is in solidary with the oppressed only when he stops
regarding the oppressed as an abstract category and sees them as persons
who have been unjustly dealt with, deprived of their voice, cheated in the
sale of their labor—when he stops making pious, sentimental, and
individualistic gestures and risks an act of love. True solidarity is found
only in the plenitude of this act of love, in its existentiality, in its praxis.
To affirm that men and women are persons and as persons should be free,
and yet to do nothing tangible to make this affirmation a reality, is a
farce.40
I do not know where this work falls within the hazy discourse of settlers unsettling their work
and striving toward an anti-colonial mindset, but I do know that I am listening, learning, and
acting as conscientiously as I can within my means at this time. This is my small act of love.
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CHAPTER 2: SURVEYING THE LANDSCAPE
“Those who continue their work – to pick up, to revitalize, and to maintain their laws, their institutions,
and their ways – join with long lines of others, reaching back countless generations: others who have
continued the efforts of those who came before them, efforts to maintain their communities, their
traditions, and their roles within creation.”
- Dawnis Kennedy (Minnawaanagogiizhigook), “Reconciliation without Respect? Section 35 and
Indigenous Legal Orders”, 2007 41

2.1 Introduction
As the place of Indigenous legal traditions within the Canadian legal system receives
increasing scholarly attention, so do potential means of realizing operational space for
Indigenous laws. An inherent assumption in much of the literature appears to be that the reason
for identifying and utilizing operational spaces is to secure the recognition of the state.
Indigenous constitutions and constitutionalism – the focus of this review – fall squarely within
this realm. The practical function of Indigenous constitutions is, however, scarcely mentioned.
The prevalence and significance of Indigenous constitutions make their absence from the
literature on the revitalization of Indigenous law conspicuous. The oversight is such that most
direct writing on the topic of Indigenous constitutions (and constitutionalism) is by John
Borrows, the foremost Indigenous legal scholar and constitutionalist in Canada. His publications
on the topic are, however, limited. The Indigenous constitutional gap in Indigenous legal
scholarship requires researchers of this topic to situate their study within a broader scope of
literature on the revitalization of Indigenous legal orders. The demands placed on researchers
befits the nature of Indigenous law: an investigation of Indigenous constitutions (and

Dawnis Kennedy (Minnawaanagogiizhigook), “Reconciliation without Respect? Section 35 and Indigenous Legal
Orders” in the Law Commission of Canada, ed, Indigenous Legal Orders (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) 77 at 10304.
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constitutionalism) must be undertaken in light of the interconnectedness of studies of Indigenous
law.
The dominant questions within the literature are what Indigenous law is or is not, how it
can be identified and practically used, whether and how Indigenous law is cognizable to
Canadian law, and what the relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous legal systems
should be. A survey of the relevant literature cannot easily be defined; the researcher must
carefully select an array of sources that capture the diverse field as it appears before them. This
literature review here is thus organized into two thematic categories: first, sources that elaborate
on the nature of Indigenous worldviews as they provide insight into Indigenous law and its
operation in the Canadian legal context; second, sources that directly address Indigenous
constitutions and constitutionalism. An analysis of these categories demonstrates that Indigenous
constitutions (and constitutionalism) cannot be understood as a positivist project distinct from the
efforts toward the revitalization of Indigenous law that require participants to alter their
conceptual frameworks to understand the law as fluid, diverse in content and form, connected to
ecology and land, and moderated by kinship.
The Indigenous constitutional gap that exists within the scholarship is not an
insurmountable hurdle to the study of Indigenous constitutions (and constitutionalism), but rather
an invitation to participate in a broader conversation. To seek to understand Indigenous
worldviews as a non-Indigenous legal scholar requires one to attempt to erase the conceptual
boundaries that are enforced by Eurocentric educational and legal institutions alike. This is a
common point of emphasis for each of the surveyed scholars, though there exists some
disagreement as to whether Indigenous legal concepts and methods are truly translatable and
how one should make them so.

16
2.2 Indigenous Legal Thought
The dominant school of thought among Indigenous scholars in what we know as Canada
is that Indigenous law is cognizable to Canadian law. Three of the primary scholars in the area
— John Borrows (Anishinaabeg), Val Napoleon (Gitskan), and Hadley Friedland (nonIndigenous, but with close familial and community ties to Cree communities in Alberta) — have
consistently argued that Indigenous law is perhaps more understandable and translatable than we
may have thought in the past. They promote the idea that Indigenous law is capable of
recognition within the Canadian legal system with the simple application of some common law
tools. John Borrows, the most prominent among them, has consistently championed both the
foundational nature of Indigenous law to Canadian constitutional law and the ability of
Indigenous law to receive state recognition and approval through an expansion of our
commitment to the rule of law and use of already existing models of legal pluralism within
Canada. The entire premise of his foundational text, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution,42
published in 2010, rests on these points. Borrows stresses that law societies and legal educational
institutions bear responsibility in the pursuit of state recognition of Indigenous law, not only in
advocacy but in shaping the minds of law students and lawyers to become receptive to the
inherent legitimacy of Indigenous law.43
John Borrows joins Val Napoleon and Hadley Friedland in the proposition that

Indigenous law can be identified and explained through the use of Eurocentric common law
tools. Borrows takes a specific focus on legal education and explains that for Indigenous law to
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be taught well, it must be a collective enterprise by legal scholars.44 For Borrows, the role of law
schools in countering Eurocentric notions of law should be seen as relational to the work of
peoples, rather than as the driving educational force.45 In other words, Indigenous peoples must
be respected as the inalienable source. The reason for this conclusion is simple: despite Borrows’
belief that Indigenous law can be categorized in kind with the common law or civil law, the truth
remains that law is rooted and grows from communities in connection with their ecology.
Common law methods for studying (and teaching) Indigenous law provide a potentially
useful means by which to understand Indigenous legal concepts and processes — inclusive of
Indigenous constitutionalism. Val Napoleon and Hadley Friedland, the designers and promoters
of the case study method, make the argument that common law tools are not only useful for
drawing law from Indigenous narratives but that they can form the basis for a robust and
respectful engagement across legal systems.46 Their method is an adaptation of a case analysis
method with which most law students are familiar and thus help to bridge some of the conceptual
gaps between Indigenous and Eurocentric legal thought. This method allows unfamiliar and
familiar listeners alike to engage in a means of listening that is both innovative and traditional in
its application of formal legal analysis is comparable to traditional means of active listening that
include listeners in the telling of stories containing what can be seen as akin to legal precedent.47
The efforts of Val Napoleon and Hadley Friedland to make Indigenous legal concepts and
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processes more understandable to a broader audience to argue for their legitimate recognition by
the state, like John Borrows’ work, speak to their view that Indigenous legal thought is
translatable to Canadian law.
Chickasaw legal scholar James [Sákej] Youngblood Henderson disagrees, at least in part,
with the image of Indigenous legal thought as translatable to Canadian law. Though perhaps he
does not explicitly say that Indigenous legal thought is not cognizable to Canadian law or
Eurocentric thinkers, Henderson does present a more complex view of what that translatability
might look like. Published in the early 2000s, two of Henderson’s most cited works focus on the
cognitive hurdles between the current state of Indigenous law and what he wants to see it
become.48 For Henderson, Eurocentrism is the dominant barrier to bridging the gap between
Indigenous worldviews and non-Indigenous worldviews — not because of the differences
between them, but rather due to the power imbalance between Indigenous worldviews and
Eurocentrism as a product of colonial violence and oppression.49 The very legal and educational
institutions championed by Borrows, Napoleon, and Friedland as potential tools in the
revitalization of Indigenous law are in Henderson’s eyes part of the Eurocentric strong-arm.50
Their function to him is as vehicles for the cognitive imprisonment of Indigenous peoples into a
paradigm that holds Eurocentric thought as superior to Indigenous thought.51
Two perspectives characterize Henderson’s view: first, that Indigenous thought must

break free from the conceptual boundaries enforced by Eurocentrism in the settler-colonial
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context; second, that it is perhaps unavoidable that Indigenous scholars engage with Eurocentric
paradigms, but only to a certain extent. He acknowledges that Indigenous peoples must be
mindful of Eurocentric worldviews in the earliest stages of decolonization for the sake of
survival,52 but writes that Indigenous peoples must renounce Eurocentric models and learn to
create Indigenous models that move toward a postcolonial existence.53 For Henderson, to do so
would mean to “exist with dignity and integrity.”54 The need for Indigenous peoples to break free
from Eurocentric models is not only a challenge to colonial power dynamics but also a necessity
because Eurocentric thinkers cannot cast off their colonial assumptions to appreciate the
elegance and subtlety of Indigenous thought.55
No matter their opinion on whether Indigenous legal thought can be translated and
understood in the Canadian legal context, every reviewed scholar takes particular care to redefine
the boundaries of what most readers might understand to be law and to resist pan-Indigenous
portraits of Indigenous worldviews and law. Val Napoleon and Hadley Friedland created a new
model of case analysis for Indigenous stories because the law within those stories might
otherwise not be understood by those unfamiliar with it.56 Beginning with the principle that
“some Indigenous stories embed law, legal principles, and legal processes,”57 Napoleon and
Friedland implement an analysis that is both traditional58 and innovative. They explain how in
one instance, through the use of a workshop activity that served as an analogy for Cree and Dene

stores – in this case, a bannock-making context – a warm atmosphere developed among a diverse
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group of people, thereby setting a framework for respectful engagement. The communal
atmosphere that developed during the activity carried into the segment of the workshop in which
the participants listened to academics deliver papers, followed by participants deciphering, and
later synthesizing, the law within a sample of Cree and Dene stories (with the help of a trained
facilitator). The findings were presented at the end.59 The use of an adapted model of legal
analysis created a collaborative space in which participants were able to respectfully engage with
Indigenous law, while also reflecting on their own group dynamics.60 This model is one example
of how bridges can be built between legal understandings. To create a conceptual bridge familiar
to Eurocentric understandings of law was a practical means of closing the cognitive gap.
Tuma Young, a Mi’kmaq scholar from Malagawatch First Nation in Nova Scotia,
acknowledges the conceptual gap between Indigenous and Eurocentric worldviews as the most
difficult challenge to overcome and cites this as the reason for a high rate of failure among
initiatives to establish operable Indigenous legal institutions.61 Rather than offer a model for
bridging the gap, Young favours efforts to explain the foundational elements of Indigenous legal
worldviews that make them what he calls a “practised attunement” (conceptual, experiential, and
linguistic) that interlocks all life.62 Here, Young references and mirrors Henderson’s own
attempts to explain the foundational distinction of Indigenous worldviews as the conceptual
focus on a circular vision of all life forms.63

Aaron Mills, whose work has positioned him as an respected Anishinaabe scholar with a
focus on constitutionalism, approaches the conceptual gap by incorporating Anishinaabe legal
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thought and narrative structure into his 2010 article, “Aki, Anishinaabek, kaye tahsh Crown”,64
to demonstrate an Anishinaabe way of understanding while also identifying discrete laws for his
readers. He does so in a traditional sense before discussing Anishinaabe law today or evaluating
the impact of Canadian law on Anishinaabe people. His focus is not on the intimacies of
Indigenous worldviews and legal thought, as it is with Henderson and Young, but rather a more
broad-scoped vision of basic principles, such as stewardship obligations, and how they differ
from obligations in Canadian law.65 Mills’ way of crossing the conceptual divide is that of a
theoretical engagement that acknowledges distinctions without suggesting that it is anyone’s
business to learn the finer details of Indigenous worldviews unless by experiencing them
themselves.
John Borrows has gone to great lengths throughout his career to bridge that same gap
while reminding his readers that it can never fully be done. His landmark 2010 publications,
Canada’s Indigenous Constitution66and Drawing Out Law: A Spirit’s Guide,67 identify and
translate Indigenous legal traditions in the Canadian legal context while also demonstrating the
basic conceptual differences that make Indigenous law distinct and worth hearing. Borrows
argues that Indigenous legal principles are identifiable and provides an overview of eight
Indigenous legal orders in Canada’s Indigenous Constitution.68 He cautions that there will, of
course, be the normal challenges of accessing Indigenous laws and of making them intelligible to

Canadian law. He also anticipates common, uninformed criticisms that Indigenous peoples
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receive undue special treatment and reframes the argument to suggest that an equitable approach
is one that makes room for the practice and recognition of Indigenous laws.69
In Drawing Out Law, published at the same time as Canada’s Indigenous Constitution,
John Borrows changes his tone and methods. Whereas he took a more typically Eurocentric
structure and approach to Indigenous law in Canada’s Indigenous Constitution, he chooses
instead to use Drawing Out Law as a vehicle for presenting Indigenous (Anishinaabeg)
worldviews and methodology. The book is structured as a series of related semi-autobiographical
narratives that attempt to demonstrate some aspects of an Anishinaabeg worldview and how the
legal concepts within that worldview might be juxtaposed with Canadian law. Borrows includes
stories written in the style of Anishinaabeg storytelling with pictographs and legal academic
discussions of how Canadian legal policies interact with Indigenous communities. The stories
within the book are designed to take readers at the pace of a listener in a traditional style of
Anishinaabeg literacy and they feature supernatural beings, ancestors, animals, plants, insects,
and rocks as legal sources and actors.70 His emphasis that the reader should take care to search
for the deeper symbolism within the work and his deliberate replication of the pacing of oral
storytelling is a way of demonstrating Anishinaabeg law, rather than providing readers with a
direct translation of concepts.
It is in Drawing Out Law that John Borrows appears to have the most in common with

scholars like James [Sákej] Youngblood Henderson and Tuma Young. Borrows demonstration of
the circular rhythms of Anishinaabeg law and his demonstration of the importance of experience,
place, and language are aligned with Henderson’s and Young’s emphasis on the significance of
the distinctiveness of Indigenous worldviews to understanding Indigenous law. Henderson
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emphasizes that experience, knowledge, and physical space (or ecology) are intertwined.71 The
language itself, the sounds of words, are related to consciousness and the multiplicity and
fluctuations of ecologies.72 As Henderson elegantly writes, "Aboriginal worldviews are empirical
relationships with local ecosystems, and Aboriginal languages are an expression of the
relationships.”73 Tuma Young enthusiastically agrees with Henderson’s descriptions of the
relationship between lifeworlds and law by echoing how, in the L’nu context, “the language is
actually derived from the sounds and rhythms of ecology, nature in action. The L’nu can thus not
only fluently but naturally communicate ideas, thoughts, perspectives, values, needs, and desires
with each other and other life forces.”74 For Young, an emphasis on the fluctuations of time and
space are essential, distinctive elements of Indigenous worldviews.75
Borrows’ willingness to publish a monograph that mimics Anishinaabeg literacy counters
what Henderson calls Eurocentric thinkers’ perception of Indigenous worldviews as “lifeworlds
without systems.”76 Unlike Henderson, a scholar with reservations about whether Eurocentric
thinkers can truly grasp the distinctive conceptual boundaries of Indigenous worldviews,
Borrows carefully presents his worldview with the trust that readers can engage with it and
understand the deeper meanings within. In this way, Borrows has shown great faith in the
cognizability of Indigenous worldviews and law, making Drawing Out Law a unique
contribution to the scholarship on the revitalization of Indigenous law.

Indigenous constitutions and constitutionalism have been absent in the scholarly
conversation to this point in this literature review. At least, these concepts have been absent in
James [Sákéj] Youngblood Henderson, “Ayukpachi”, supra note 48 at 260.
Ibid at 262.
73
Ibid at 259.
74
Tuma Young, supra note 61 at 93.
75
Ibid at 79. It is for this reason, Young writes, that space is considered more important than time as a constant
connecting force that dictates the cyclical motions of life.
76
James [Sákéj] Youngblood Henderson, “Ayukpachi”, supra note 48 at 252.
71
72

24
the sense that they have not been directly mentioned by name. The nature of Indigenous
worldviews and Indigenous law, including whether that law can be understood by outsiders,
translatable, or cognizable to the Canadian legal system, is essential to the question of the
function and place of Indigenous constitutions and constitutionalism. A question relevant to this
study, for example, whether Anishinaabeg worldviews and law can be adequately expressed in a
written constitutional document styled in a form suggestive of Eurocentric constitutional
documents. One might ask who the arbiter of these questions is and whether any academic stance
on the issue of the function of Indigenous constitutions is relevant to community understandings
of their purpose. Looming is the question as to whether, if constitutionalism can be seen as
inherent in Indigenous legal traditions, as will be explored in the second section of this literature
review, written documents are a bastardization of those traditions that constrain them to
Eurocentric conceptual boundaries.

2.3 Indigenous Constitutions and Constitutionalism
Constitutionalism can be understood as an adherence to basic standards and principles
that align with an overarching standard of ethics. In a more formal sense, it is the written or
unwritten fundamental legal framework of a nation. It functions to empower and constrain
government while outlining the basic principles by which the named government is expected to
conduct itself. Its scope expands from governmental duties and relations with external
governments to the most fundamental rights and protections of citizens.77 Democratic structures
moderate the relationship between government and individuals, regulating the government and
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demanding that the government regulate. Sovereignty is an intimate component of
constitutionalism, resting at the heart of the authority of the government.78
Constitutionalism is part of Indigenous legal traditions. However, very little has been
published on matters of Indigenous constitution-building and constitutionalism. This appears to
be a conspicuous gap in the academic literature on the revitalization of Indigenous law. John
Borrows writes that Indigenous constitutional structures are entangled in Indigenous worldviews
and describes these structures as shifting and transforming with the ebb and flow of political,
economic, and social life.79 Borrows argues that Indigenous constitutionalism can be understood
to have influenced Canadian constitutional development – if at least through Parliament’s
suppression of Indigenous constitutional structures.80 Nevertheless, there exist at least some
rumblings of questions regarding Indigenous constitutionalism in the absence of sustained
scholarly study of the subject.
Stephen Cornell argues that any choice in governance framed as one between
constitutionalism or traditional ways of life is a false choice because constitutionalism is an
Indigenous tradition.81 The essence of Cornell’s argument is that constitutionalism can exist in
unwritten legal principles and need not be confined to written documents. An underlying body of
principles, transmitted orally from generation to generation to order processes of individual and
collective action is enough to found constitutional traditions.82 Descriptions of Indigenous legal

orders and the ordering legal principles found within them, as published by many Indigenous
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legal scholars, support Cornell’s assertion and Borrows’ acknowledgement of historic
Indigenous constitutionalism. It is these underlying legal principles, whether they are found in
kinship and stewardship responsibilities or more general understandings of how to exist in
relation to one’s ecology, that form the heart of Indigenous constitutionalism wherein individuals
and collectives are held to a higher law than that which they manufacture.83
It is clear that underlying legal principles and frameworks can be understood to be
constitutional frameworks, at least in a loose Eurocentric understanding of constitutionalism.
Certainly, unwritten constitutional principles remain key interpretive sources of Canadian
constitutional documents.84 More debatable is if constitutionalism is a functional, traditional
Indigenous legal framework, why then communities might need or want to codify it. Cornell
suggests that thinking constitutionally is more important than writing a constitutional
document.85 A written constitutional document, he suggests, is most valuable to communities
that are geographically or culturally diverse.86 Though Cornell does not state the purpose of his
approach to questions of Indigenous constitutionalism, it appears that he is examining their
existence and use as guiding frameworks for a community function. His study leaves open
questions regarding how Indigenous constitutionalism interacts with state law and whether such
frameworks might provide some jurisdictional relief for Indigenous communities living under
the thumb of governance structures they do not control. A written constitution seems in Cornell’s

terms to be a means of non-binding unification rather than a hard-won expression of collective
will.87
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John Borrows’ descriptions of forms of inherent Indigenous constitutionalism and
Stephen Cornell’s adamant support of Indigenous constitutionalism as legitimate, whether
written or unwritten, lead to the question of whether written constitutions are appropriately
Indigenous. Cornell argues that constitutionalism is not inherently a Western colonial creation
and can be found within the guiding principles of Indigenous legal orders. Borrows identifies
Indigenous constitutionalism in a variety of Indigenous legal traditions and is known to provide
support for communities drafting their own constitutions. On the other hand, James [Sákéj]
Youngblood Henderson might disagree. Henderson’s suspicion of using Eurocentric legal
methods to examine Indigenous law and his desire to see Indigenous peoples break free of
colonial conceptual boundaries with creative models of their own making88 suggest that
Henderson might critique the development of written Indigenous constitutions. Though
constitutionalism may be Indigenous, the form and content of written constitutions might more
closely mirror Eurocentric constitutional documents.
Henderson is adamant that “Indigenous peoples cannot construct Indigenous order, law,
remedies and solidarity on Eurocentric foundations.”89 Henderson cites a well-known Audre
Lord quote, that “the Master’s tools have not been designed to dismantle the Master’s house.”90
For Henderson, written Indigenous constitutions, though they may have value in some times and
places,91 may well be one of the Master’s tools. Henderson views the duty of those engaging

with Indigenous law as being to stretch well beyond blending or unifying Indigenous and state
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law.92 Henderson’s arguments on the limitations of the use of the master’s tools suggest that he
would be critical of attempts to develop written Indigenous constitutions as a means of resisting
colonial oppression, for in this form of resistance is still some measure of participation. This
stance is in opposition to the school of thought to which most prominent Indigenous legal
scholars ascribe; that is, for Indigenous law to see a robust revitalization, it must grow and
operate in the current context and to the benefit of Indigenous peoples who have relationships to
the Canadian state that cannot be relinquished (and which many would not care to sever).
Indigenous law, like Canadian law, is adaptive to contemporary contexts.93 John
Borrows is the most prominent opponent to the notion that Indigenous communities would be
best served by denying their modern relationship with colonial governing bodies. Such a denial
would contradict important conceptual commitments to relationship-building. In any case, to do
so is a practical impossibility.94 Without direct reference to Henderson, Borrows states that he
“doubt[s] the truth of the idea that the master tools can not destroy the master’s house. A
hammer, saw and backhoe are instruments of creation and destruction. It is possible to use these
tools to undo the thing that has been created. The same can be said of legislation.”95 Whatever
the disagreements between scholars, written Indigenous constitutions have flourished in
Canada.96
The most descriptive study of Indigenous constitutions in Canada is Christopher

Alcantara’s and Greg Whitfield’s 2010 article, “Aboriginal Self-Government through
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Constitutional Design: A Survey of Fourteen Aboriginal Constitutions in Canada”.97 As the title
indicates, this publication takes the form of a survey of a sample of (West Coast) Indigenous
constitutional documents rather than the form of a theoretical investigation of the nature of their
content and legitimacy. Alcantara and Whitfield, in line with John Borrows’ arguments, argue
that modern Indigenous constitutions “must” (to an undefined extent) reflect some of the core
constitutional principles of Canada because modern Indigenous constitutions exist within the
broad constitutional framework of Canada.98 They provide no justification for this assertion, but
it appears to be attached to their consideration of only constitutions that have been adopted by
First Nations in relation to modern treaties or self-governance agreements. The conclusion of
their empirical study is that the differences between Indigenous and non-Indigenous
constitutions are small.99
Whereas Cornell’s observations suggested that Indigenous constitutionalism takes a
wholly internal approach,100 Alcantara and Whitfield found that most Indigenous constitutional
documents in British Columbia focus on the duties of their own governments to citizens as well
as on the relationship between their government and external bodies, including the Canadian
state.101 Echoing Borrows’ commentary on the nature of Anishinaabe constitutional articles as
hortatory, rather than coercive,102 Alcantara and Whitfield note that citizenship responsibilities
recognized within modern Indigenous constitutions tend to be constructed in the form of guiding

principles rather than enforceable rules.103 The function of these documents, according to
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Borrows, is that they should empower communities to make independent decisions regarding
issues that impact their lives and land, including decisions about wildlife management,
conservation, housing, education, economic development, child welfare, and community
membership. They empower elected government while ensuring that there are enforceable
checks on its powers.104 Constitutions may be written so as to encourage members to live life in a
good way, including the encouragement of language revitalization. Alcantara and Whitfield
observe that the use of a nation’s own language and concepts varies across the surveyed
constitutions,105 but Borrows instead appeals to the view that the incorporation of a nation’s
language is important to facilitate living in the manner held within the worldview interconnected
with the language.106 Borrows appears to favour a more holistic, internally looking yet relational
framework than Alcantara and Whitfield observed in British Columbia.
Aaron Mills’ (Waabishki Ma’iingan) recently completed PhD dissertation examines
Indigenous legalities, emphasizing the “earth-centric ‘rooted’ form of constitutionalism” that
operates within Anishinaabe legality.107 Mills advocates for treaty mutualism, defined as a
simple extension of mutual aid kinships, in which relationships between peoples are the logical
extension of relationships between persons.108 This model rests on an understanding of rooted
constitutionalism that requires an acceptance of the incommensurability of Indigenous and settler
legalities109 in order to function.110 Mills provides more texture to his theoretical analysis of
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insight into his perspective on the foundations and nature of Anishinaabe constitutionalism.
These publications include “Aki, Anishinaabek, kaye tahsh Crown”, referenced in the previous
section of this chapter,111 and “An Anishinaabe Constitutional Order”,112 co-written with Karen
Drake and Tanya Muthusamipillai. Both publications provide readers with artful descriptions of
how Anishinaabe constitutionalism tends to differ from liberal Western constitutionalism. Mills
analyses the structure of Anishinaabe constitutionalism as one based on interdependence, mutual
aid, and harmony rather than provide fine details of Anishinaabe law that would become
distorted without an understanding of the underlying constitutional order.113 Actual Anishinaabe
constitutional documents are absent from Mills’ work, in which he takes a more theoretical
approach to understanding culture and history rather than address practical efforts of
constitutional continuity by contemporary Anishinaabe communities.
The few publications on Indigenous constitutions (and constitutionalism) leave much to
be explored. It is unknown whether the findings of the study conducted by Christopher Alcantara
and Greg Whitfield bear current relevance or whether those findings are indicative of a broader
trend in Indigenous constitutional development. Christopher Cornell has confirmed that, in his
consideration of the topic, Indigenous constitutionalism is indeed a traditional framework that
bears modern relevance, but he does not delve deeper into the consideration of written
constitutional documents. John Borrows, the most prominent Indigenous legal scholar (as well as

a constitutional scholar) recognizes traditional Indigenous constitutionalism and advocates for
the development of modern written constitutions but does not examine their lived function or
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refer to a spectrum of constitutional documents.114 The gaps in available publications on the
topic of Indigenous constitutions (and constitutionalism) call back, in a circular way, the
academic investigation of Indigenous law and worldviews, and the debate as to whether their
form and content can truly be translated, or ever be cognizable to the Canadian legal system. The
production and ratification of Indigenous constitutions are themselves, I argue, evidence that the
nations involved believe that their laws can be sufficiently translated.
Underlying this debate is the concern about whether Indigenous law will see
revitalization and respect from the state if it is not seen as cognizable to the Canadian legal
system. Kirsten Manley-Casimir, a non-Indigenous scholar, answers this concern with a
powerful shrug: it does not matter whether Indigenous law is cognizable to Canadian law for it to
strengthen and operate in a contemporary context. Commensurability itself mirrors the “single,
great values” jurispathic approach of state law that would not allow for the operation of multiple
legal systems founded in different normative values.115 Rather, she argues, scholars should fight
for the incommensurability of Indigenous law in order to preserve its distinctiveness and to
promote the continuation of multiple legal systems.116 Manley-Casimir and Mills share the
position that an acceptance of incommensurability is vital to an operation of law that minimizes
colonial violence. Recognition and acceptance of incommensurability as it applies to the
relationship between Indigenous legal thought and Canadian law offers scholars and politicians
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alike to seek the practical implementation of means of communication and operation between
legal systems in a way that, though challenging, would better reflect Indigenous legal values.117
An acceptance of incommensurability also serves as a weight against the detrimental
miscommunications that litter the gaps between Indigenous worldviews and Canadian law.118
Commensurability, then, is not a requirement to respect and forms of recognition that should
stem from a nation-to-nation relationship between Indigenous nations and Canada. Acceptance
of the incommensurability of Indigenous law is potentially significant within the literature
surrounding Indigenous constitutions (and constitutionalism). Manley-Casimir’s writing supports
a community-focused approach to Indigenous constitutionalism that does not disregard external
relationships. In essence, acceptance of potential incommensurability lifts the pressure of
constitutional conformity and allows Indigenous constitutions, at least theoretically, to merit the
same standard of recognition by the state whatever their makeup, as long as they have been
developed and adopted with community consent.

2.4 Conclusion
Publications on Indigenous constitutions and constitutionalism are few in number and
slight in their offerings, but a broader view of the foundations of Indigenous law presented in
literature written primarily by Indigenous scholars serves as guidance for researchers attempting

to understand the nature and function of Indigenous constitutions as legal instruments. The
publications analyzed in this literature review offer a form of scholarly guidance that departs
from the state-centred focus of publications focused on governance and sovereignty. While those
publications are also important tools in the examination of Indigenous constitutionalism, it is
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significant to first understand Indigenous constitutionalism as inherently Indigenous in form and
as an expression of Indigenous law before endeavouring to place these understudied Indigenous
legal instruments in direct relation to state law that bears significantly more scholarly and
institutional power.
Writings on Indigenous constitutionalism, set within the broader context of publications
on the nature and translatability of Indigenous law, offer a remarkable amount of space for new
studies on the subject. Indigenous constitutions have much to offer in a context where
Indigenous law is receiving increasing attention and there may be a movement toward a change
in the relationship between Indigenous communities and Canada. As documents that are
increasingly common as voluntarily adopted legal instruments by Indigenous communities, in
part in relation to broader self-government agreements, Indigenous constitutions are an
understudied means of moderating both internal governance and inter-governmental relations
alongside the revitalization of Indigenous law.
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CHAPTER 3: ROOTING LAW
“[O]ne cannot enact legislation to force one individual to respect another.”
-Mead, Aroha Te Pareake, “Misappropriation of Indigenous Knowledge: The Next Wave of
Colonisation”, 1994 119

3.1 Introduction
The study of Anishinaabe constitutions in Ontario is unthinkable without an examination
of the treatment of Indigenous law in Canada. Law as it is typically espoused in our academic
and political institutions is grounded in the authority of the Canadian state – an authority that
draws its power from the subjugation and erasure of Indigenous law and legal authority. The
erasing of Indigenous legal authority must be the foundation of Canadian legal authority because,
as recognized by Canada’s highest court (by then Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin) in a
statement that contradicts the foundations of Crown sovereignty, “[p]ut simply, Canada’s
Aboriginal [sic] peoples were here when Europeans came, and were never conquered.”120
Canada’s sovereignty, so far as it is an expression of singular or hierarchical power, is a cracked
legal fiction.121 Nevertheless, the fiction persists.
Canadian and Indigenous sovereignties are both rooted in the land. Nowhere can this be
better observed than in the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence on Aboriginal rights and
title, which is characterized by the Court’s failure to recognize Indigenous legal authority. The
common law has become a battle ground for those seeking to hold the state accountable for
colonial violence:
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From the “duty to consult”, the “honour of the Crown”, and Aboriginal
rights, Indigenous peoples and Canadian courts have been in constant
tension in attempting to forge new routes to improve Indigenous peoples’
place within the Canadian state, and to reconcile their claims with
Canadian sovereignty.122
Some gains are made, but courts are ultimately actors of the state. For example, the Supreme
Court of Canada has rejected the doctrine of terra nullius (that Crown sovereignty was
established in Canada through the assertion of occupation and control of empty lands), but
immediately appeared to contradict that rejection. In Tsilhqot'in Nation v British Columbia,
Chief Justice McLachlin (as she then was), writing for a unanimous court, declared that, “[t]he
doctrine of terra nullius (that no one owned the land prior to European assertion of sovereignty)
never applied in Canada.”123 The Court then went on to declare that, “[a]t the time of assertion of
European sovereignty, the Crown acquired radical or underlying title to all the land in the
province.”124 Thus, state sovereignty exists in a space where it was never rightfully nor lawfully
gained, but state authority over Indigenous peoples is legitimized.
There is much criticism of the twilight zone of sovereignty. John Borrows calls attention
to the Court’s contradictions and writes that, not only has the doctrine of terra nullius been used
to justify singular state sovereignty, “Canadian law still has terra nullius written all over it.”125 It
is unmistakable in the Crown’s legal deeming of lands as vacant for the purpose of granting itself
authority over those lands without necessitating the conquest or consent of Indigenous
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peoples.126 Those lands deemed vacant, which we now call Canada, were occupied by and under
the stewardship of Indigenous nations. Precisely how the Crown assumed territorial sovereignty
remains unexplained by the Court. The assumption of Crown sovereignty – in the absence of the
agreement or conquest of Indigenous peoples – conjures a legal vacuum where we imagine the
Crown’s territorial sovereignty must nevertheless exist.127
Indigenous law has been reduced to what James [Sakéj] Youngblood refers to as a
“constitutional whisper”.128 The Supreme Court of Canada has declined to recognize or apply a
specific Indigenous law even once, despite precedent for its integration into Canadian law as in
Connolly v Woolrich.129 In that landmark 1867 decision, Justice Monk of the Québec Superior
Court recognized the legitimacy of customary Cree marriage law in a case of its conflict with
Canadian law.130 While the decision in this case is representative of the ability of Canadian
courts to recognize Indigenous law in the Canadian common law, it is also representative of how
such recognition has been largely relegated to the realm of family matters.
More recent case law ties the recognition of traditional adoptions to that of customary
marriage, as in Casimel v Insurance Corporation of British Columbia,131 in which a man and
woman had adopted their son’s child according to Carrier law and were held by the court to be
dependent parents under the provincial Insurance Act. The court in Casimel held unanimously
that a statute must clearly and explicitly state its intent to extinguish the rights conferred by a
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marriage in order to do so, and that extinguishment could not be assumed.132 In Manychief v
Poffenroth, decided in Alberta only a year later, Justice McBain held that, “[t]he validity of
customary Indian marriage and resulting status makes sense, provided native laws and customs
are not repugnant to natural justice, equity, and good conscience.”133 Such recognition of the
validity customary marriage is not, however, treated as a flat recognition of the validity of
Indigenous law and jurisdiction – if a customary marriage is recognized as valid by a court, then
that marriage is made subject to any applicable provincial or federal laws.134
The recognition of customary marriage may also be subject to scrutiny linked to the
standards for Aboriginal rights recognition under s. 35(1) of the Canadian Constitution Act,
1982. An example of this view can be found in the Ontario Insurance Commission’s decision in
Hill v Zurich Insurance Co,135 in which it was held that, “marriage by custom requires more than
simply following the current norms of the community...There must be an aboriginal dimension
involving an integral component of the community’s traditional way of life or culture.”136 And
so, even where there is an opportunity to recognize customary Indigenous law in this form, such
recognition may easily be confined to the framing of Indigenous law as frozen in time, precontact with European settlers. This recognition is a double-edged sword: a validation of
Indigenous customary legal authority on one edge, a denial of its robustness and extended
authority on the other. Observations of legal suppression are more realistic in the analysis of the
treatment of Indigenous legal orders within Canadian law.
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3.2

Legal Suppression
A view into the issues surrounding the legal suppression of Indigenous legal authorities

involves more than broad discussions of sovereignty. This suppression includes both the use of
state law to structure Indigenous governance and restrict community activity, as well as the
refusal of the state and its actors to recognize the legitimacy of Indigenous law. Law shapes the
paternalistic relationship between the state and Indigenous peoples in which the state’s
institutions monopolize social dynamics.137 The national culture is, to a large extent, dominated
by the language of the state: “The entire bureaucracy, the entire court system, all industry hears
and uses the colonizer's language. Likewise, highway markings, railroad station signs, street
signs and receipts make the colonized feel like a foreigner in his own country.”138 The language
of the colonizer persists in the positive law and common law of Canada, rendering Indigenous
peoples subject to its commands.
The Indian Act139 is an odious example concrete paternalism as legislation designed to
restrict the activities of Indigenous communities and stifle their ability to self-govern in an effort
to assimilate Indigenous people – all while professing the state’s recognition of the special status
of Indigenous peoples in Canada. The Indian Act is, as summarized in the 1983 Report by the
Special Committee on Indian Self-Government in Canada (the “Penner Report”), a “mechanism
of social control and assimilation.”140 Indigenous communities are left dependent on the Indian
Act, while straining against its snare.141
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The suppression of Indigenous legal authority (and governance) in the common law is
more concealed. Aboriginal rights and title claims go to the heart of disputes over sovereignty
and the potential for state recognition of Indigenous law. The Supreme Court of Canada has
made minor gestures toward Indigenous law in this realm. In her dissent in R v Van der Peet,
Justice McLachlin (as she then was) noted “the ancestral laws and customs” of Indigenous
peoples and called their recognition “a golden thread” that can be seen “running through this
history, from its earliest beginnings to the present time.”142 This explicit use of the language of
law to refer to Indigenous legal orders echoed in later decisions. In Delgamuukw v British
Columbia, the Court again took notice of Indigenous law in “the rules of property found in
aboriginal legal systems.” and accepts that law as one of the sources of Aboriginal title143 Again,
in Tsilhqot'in, the Court took notice of “the perspective of the Aboriginal group, which,
depending on its size and manner of living, might conceive of possession of land in a somewhat
different manner than did the common law.”144 The “perspective of the Aboriginal group”
appears to give some reference to Indigenous legal orders but the language falls short of explicit
recognition.
What appears to be a recognition of Indigenous law within the common law in Canada is
deceptive. Once more, we can take examples from Tsilhqot'in. The Court reaffirms, with
reference to its decision in Delgamuukw, that, “[t]he question of sufficient occupation must be
approached from both the common law perspective and the Aboriginal perspective”145 and that,
“[t]he Aboriginal perspective focuses on laws, practices, customs and traditions of the group.”146
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The Court’s references to the ‘Aboriginal perspective’ and the ‘ancestral laws and customs’ of
Indigenous peoples are evasive. Instead, the Supreme Court of Canada has established a
precedent of a “lack of engagement with Indigenous law.”147 That lack of engagement is tied to
the paradoxical qualification made by former Chief Justice Lamer in R v Van der Peet that the
‘Aboriginal perspective’ “must be framed in terms cognizable to the Canadian legal and
constitutional structure.”148 This was echoed in R v Marshall; R v Bernard, a case concerning
Mi’kmaq claims to Aboriginal title, in which the Court rejected the claims on the basis that the
“the pre-sovereignty aboriginal practice” must “translate” into a “modern legal right.”149
Indigenous law, then, has the right to common law recognition as existing or previously existing,
so long as it is translatable to the Canadian common law.150 The disposition of the Court to both
freeze Indigenous practices and legal rights in the past while interpreting their continued
legitimacy according to the legal structures of the colonial state leaves only a narrow window for
their recognition. That lack of engagement, or refusal to engage, with Indigenous law (and its
distinctions) hinders the Court’s stated goal of reconciliation and falls short of the decolonizing
approach called for by Indigenous peoples.
State recognition of the authority of Indigenous law depends on much more than whether
that law is commensurable to Canadian law. Juridical interpretation of Indigenous law — that is
both of the authority of Indigenous peoples to create and conduct law and the weight of that law
in the Canadian legal system — carries potential for harm and for help. To this point, the most
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notable outcome of Canadian jurisprudence on Indigenous law has been that of harm. The goal
of upholding the status quo and supporting the aims of the state favours Crown sovereignty,
which in turn undermines the self-determination of Indigenous communities.151 The Canadian
legal system (and actors like judges within it) has been complicit in the oppression of Indigenous
communities.152 In the face of a history of legal oppression, Kirsten Manley-Casimir writes,
“[m]onumental shifts” and a “significant restructuring of… institutions and relationships” are
necessary and, until then, “it is entirely reasonable for Indigenous peoples to question whether
Canadian institutions deserve Indigenous peoples’ respect”.153
3.3 “Putting Words in the Cat’s Mouth”154: On Understanding Indigenous Law
Indigenous legal orders,155 as Val Napoleon commonly calls the laws of Indigenous
peoples, are “embedded in social, political, economic, and spiritual institutions”156 of those
peoples who develop them, are distinct from Eurocentric law.157 Indigenous legal orders are as
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diverse as the communities and nations that produce and maintain them.158 Common elements
among Indigenous legal orders include similar sources of law, the function of kinship structures,
an emphasis on language, reciprocal obligations among people, animals, and nature, and
flexibility. Indigenous legal scholars from many nations emphasize these commonalities and
appeal to them as foundational to the process of legal revitalization. The call for revitalization
echoes in many languages.
Indigenous legal sources shape both the form and content of legal orders.159 The
connection between law and ecology plays a central role. The natural movement of ecology
demonstrates the role of people within their environment and offers insight into their human
obligations of stewardship over lands and waters. Natural law compels Indigenous peoples to
care for foundational sources of all life, rather than conceptualize those sources as property to be
parceled and owned (as in Canadian law). Henderson highlights two primary understandings in
Indigenous worldviews: “First, they understand the ecosystem as an eternal system tolerant of
flux and refined by endless renewals and realignments. Second, they understand that each
ecosystem encapsulates and enfolds many forces or parts, none of which can enfold or
encapsulate the whole.”160 As the ecosystem exists in flux, so do understandings of one’s self
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and relationship to the ecosystem and its beings. Stan Wilson provides an explanation of this
fluctuation between self, relatives (human and non-human), and identity:
Like all living creatures, we as Indigenous people are sustained by our
connection to the land. Many of us include all other living organisms and
entities as part or our identity. I know Aboriginal people who refer to
themselves as a squirrel, a hawk, a bear, and thunder being. These labels
are not simple names they use to identify their individual characteristics or
personalities; rather, at different times, they have identified themselves as
the beings. This self-recognition enables us to understand where and how
we belong to this world…161
These ‘labels’, Wilson expands, are not mere self-identifiers, but rather deeply impact those who
claim and hold them, so as to provide them with grounding guidance and nourishment. In this
way, ecology informs the relational understandings that underpin Indigenous legal duties to both
environment and beings by compelling people to constantly evaluate their position and
responsibilities in the world. The natural can mix with the sacred, with some Indigenous peoples
understanding their law and obligations of stewardship as Creator-given.162 The link between
Indigenous peoples and their ecology cannot be broken, nor can the connections built between
Indigenous law and land.
The importance of kinship structures and responsibilities is emphasized by Indigenous
legal scholars. In the words of Tuma Young: “kinship is all”.163 These structures are drawn from
and interact with ecology both through relationship modeling but also in the responsibilities of
people that extend to the natural world. As Henderson explains, human beings are “but one
strand in the web of life”164 and they must therefore consider non-human beings on an even plane
with themselves. Non-human beings can take on powerful roles, as Zoë Todd artfully describes:
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In my life, I have been bound to fish. Fish have been my teachers… My
grandfather, nimosôm, was animated by a different animal, horses… I also
imagine that he drew horses on the walls of settler-colonial prairie homes
as a way of re-inscribing his/our reciprocal responsibilities to more-thanhuman beings within landscapes that had been heavily violated by settlercolonial economic and political exigencies.165
This obligation-shaping perspective makes Indigenous legal thought distinct from that of
Eurocentric law, which gives prominence to human beings over nature.
Relations between humans and non-humans is central to Indigenous legal thought and the
legal obligations that are drawn from the land. Anishinaabeg scholar John Borrows provides us
the humorous example of the importance of on-reserve dogs in relation to Indigenous
communities and as a shifting symbol of how Indigenous life has changed and responded to
settler colonialism. In the context of a story, Borrows writes that dogs are “mercurial, bearing the
shifting personalities of those they [live] with.”166 The central character of Borrow’s story muses
that a focus on the legal status and behaviour of dogs, beings that remind him of Nanabozho,167
might reveal much about life around them:
Such an article could be doctrinal and discuss band by-laws regulating
dogs in Indian Country. It could develop the interpretation of these laws
by various legal institutions. Or the piece could be socio-legal, exploring
the interaction between customary norms associated with dogs in
traditional Indian cultures and the adoption of more formal rules since
Indigenous contact with colonial societies. Even better, he mused, a whole
theoretical structure could be developed from such a study: ‘Critical Indian
Doggie Studies.’ It could use hermeneutical methodologies to great effect.
Or maybe someone could devise a few formulas and strive for predictive
analysis with their theory: ‘Law and Dogenomics.’168
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Borrows’s example is designed to illustrate how Indigenous law and legal theory depart from
Eurocentric thought in such a way that the distinction becomes humorous in the academy.
Language holds a special place in the revitalization of Indigenous legal orders. More than
a mere means of communication or mode of transmission for law, language is intertwined with
ecology and kinship. Language reveals essential elements of worldviews that can indicate
whether a being or item is understood to be animate or inanimate. That knowledge can impart to
the recipient whether they themselves hold responsibilities toward those beings or non-beings.169
The oral transmission of legal knowledge is, in part, reliant on the formulation of language. Of
course, Indigenous law can obviously be transmitted in any language to which the speaker has
access, but this does indicate the extent of the importance of language resurgence to Indigenous
life and self-determination. The resurgence of Indigenous languages is as much an element of the
revitalization of law as it is a goal because, “[o]nly that language would allow the colonized to
resume contact with his interrupted flow of time and to find again his lost continuity and that of
his history.”170 The basis for Indigenous language rights is itself derived from “Indigenous
customary law, where language is recognized as a sacred, inalienable right.”171 Language rights
are reflected today in the right of Indigenous peoples to the development and maintenance of
their languages, including necessary educational and cultural institutions.172
Stores and oral storytelling are vehicles of law. Tuma Young, writing on L’nu law,
explains that stories help people to reflect on how they think and behave in their world, while
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also acting as a “powerful means of cultural transmission.”173 A story “can stand as a metaphor
for the integration of the individual, as well as one for the integration of the group”.174 Stories,
bound as they are with language and morality,175 are “rich and complex intellectual resources”176
that contain “a logic, purpose, structure, and methodology.”177 The lessons found within stories
are often implicit, porous, and open to intentionally interpretation, unlike state law.178 Val
Napoleon and Hadley Friedland provide prophetic stories as one example of how stories work
with law.179 Citing Julie Cruikshank, Napoleon and Friedland explain that prophecies can help
unfamiliar circumstances seem more understandable.180 Prophecies – or stories, more generally
– can provide insight into the past while guiding the present and future:
Intellectual devices such as prophecies demonstrate how Indigenous
people have always reasoned, individually and collectively, in order to
find meaning and interpret the events in their worlds. As with the adaptive
management stories, prophecies enable people to respond to new
situations, and to bring in useful new knowledge and practices in a way
that is understandable, and thus reconcilable, with familiar normative
commitments.181
As such, stories occupy a special place in the revitalization of Indigenous law. Stories have
become a site of engagement for legal scholarship, allowing for the adaptation of legal analysis
and synthesis skills that are utilized in Canadian law. Scholars like Val Napoleon, Hadley
Friedland, and John Borrows have led the scholarly endeavor to apply modified legal analysis to

173

Tuma Young, supra note 61 at 93.
RH Whitehead, Tales from the Six Worlds: Micmac Legends (Halifax: Nimbus, 1988) at 18, as cited in Tuma
Young, ibid.
175
John Borrows observes that oral traditions are “bound up with the configuration of language, political structures,
economic systems, social relations, intellectual methodologies, morality, ideology, and the physical world.” John
Borrows, “Listening for a Change: The Courts and Oral Traditions” (2001) 39:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 1 at 8.
176
Val Napoleon and Hadley Friedland, “An Inside Job”, supra note 46 at 738.
177
Ibid at 736.
178
See: Andrée Boisselle, Law’s Hidden Canvas: Teasing Out the Threads of Coast Salish Legal Sensibility (PhD
Dissertation, University of Victoria, 2017) at 41-87.
179
See ibid at 742 for an example of a prophetic story with an interpretation.
180
Julie Cruikshank, The Social Life of Stories: Narrative and Knowledge in the Yukon Territory (Vancouver: UBC
Press, 1998) at 78, as cited in Val Napoleon and Hadley Friedland, “An Inside Job”, supra note 46 at 743.
181
Val Napoleon and Hadley Friedland, “An Inside Job”, supra note 46 at 743.
174

48
Indigenous stories in order to “continue the rich traditional practices of active listening and lively
thinking through stories.”182 This method is useful for directing the understanding of outsiders
who, by listening as best they can, “can begin to learn how the [Indigenous people] think and
what they value, and can hopefully even come to see what they see, know the laws as they know
them, understand the sacred ecological spaces as they do.”183
Indigenous law grows and breathes. The flexibility of Indigenous law is readily seen in
the emphasis placed on customary law in Canadian Indigenous legal scholarship. Customary law
– that is, the production of binding interactional norms that are generated over time, within
communities and between generations – is not unique to Indigenous legal orders,184 but has been
a vital element of their development and survival.185 Much of Indigenous law is implicit. As Val
Napoleon writes, “many Indigenous peoples are not aware of the law they know—they just take
it for granted and act on their legal obligations without talking about it.”186 Customary law lays
the groundwork for positive law in the modern context, rather than the other way around (as is
the case in Western law, which includes customary law but generally holds positive law as
king).187
Indigenous law lives within Indigenous lifeways and paradigms. While this is also true of
general state law in Canada, it is often taken for granted that state law is grounded in but one set
of understandings of the world. That is, for example, that people can hold property in land and
living things, that people exist in hierarchical relationships with nature, or that we rely on a
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certain separation of spirituality from law. We have already referenced those differences in this
chapter. Perhaps more difficult to comprehend are foundational differences in modes of thought.
Consider approaches to knowledge: in a Western paradigm, we hold that knowledge is both
individual and attainable in nature. As Shawn Wilson explains, this is “vastly different from the
Indigenous paradigm, where knowledge is seen as belonging to the cosmos of which we are a
part and where researchers are only the interpreters of this knowledge.”188
Varied understandings of the passage of time and space present similar cognitive hurdles
for outsiders. Western understandings of time assume singular realities and a linear passage of
measured moments. Such perspectives counter the multiple realities and cyclical understandings
of time that are related within some Indigenous teachings, such as in Anishinaabeg language and
oral stories. Relations to the construction and passage of time are foundational to a people’s
worldview, including the perception of those operating within that worldview have of human
relations and patterns. As Linda Tuhiwai Smith, a Māori scholar writes, “[d]ifferent orientations
towards time and space, different positioning within time and space, and different systems of
language for making space and time ‘real’ underpin notions of past and present, of place and
relationships to the land. Ideas about progress are grounded within ideas and orientations towards
time and space.”189 A Eurocentric understanding of time as linear, for example, imposes a
different perception of ‘progress’ than might an Anishinaabeg understanding of rhythmic,
cyclical time.
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3.4 Incommensurability
Discussions of the operation of Indigenous legal orders, whether or not one believes they
should have or need state recognition to achieve optimal revitalization, come back to the issue of
conceptual divides and bridges. While we have already touched on the scholarly debate on the
incommensurability of Indigenous law (see Chapter 2.3), this debate is important in the setting of
understandings of Indigenous law and its operation in the context of state law. As referenced
earlier, Indigenous scholars and advocates can be seen to fall within one of two camps on this
issue: the first group of scholars argues that Indigenous law is compatible with Canadian law and
that any contrary argument is grounded in colonial portrayals of Indigenous law as frozen (or
‘primitive’); the second group of scholars argues that an understanding of the
incommensurability of Indigenous legal norms and processes is not only not colonial, but may
serve as a defence against entrapment in what Gordon Christie calls the “colonial snare.”190
Advocates who promote state recognition of Indigenous law draw on parallels between
Indigenous legal principles and processes and those found in Canadian law.191
Incommensurability itself, the latter argue, suggests a colonial perception that Indigenous
law is weak. Narratives of incommensurability, they argue, are “[n]arratives of fragility… [and]
narratives of colonialism. The stories, and the elders and communities we have learned from, all
teach us that Indigenous laws are made of stronger stuff.”192 The association between
incommensurability and weakness hangs on its own colonial hooks. To be so different from state
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law so as to be misunderstood and distorted by it is not by default to be weak – it is just to be
different. An appreciation of essential distinctions between Indigenous world-views and the
Eurocentric193 world-views that underpin Canadian law may encourage more cautious, respectful
approaches to seeking state-recognition than could emphasizing parallels.
Placing a disproportionate emphasis on the similarities that can be found between
Indigenous legal orders and state law risks the distortion of the former. This is an issue that arises
when Indigenous law enters a Canadian courtroom. In each instance of an Aboriginal title or
rights claim, “a very real possibility arises that there could be a massive communication gap
between the cultures and that any decision based on Eurocentric cultural values may fail to fairly
resolve Aboriginal claims.”194 This ‘massive communication gap’ is detrimental. As Aaron Mills
writes:
If we were all asked to consider this matter today, perhaps a majority of
Canadians and a great many indigenous persons, too, would feel deeply
unsettled by and resist the incommensurability conclusion. As a general
matter, people don’t want to be forced to make such an enormous,
prefigurative choice, regardless of what their respective choices might be.
In Canada they’re also likely to feel resentment at being asked to do so.
Where alternative lifeways aren’t taken seriously and thus haven’t been
disclosed, difference appears to exist only within one’s own lifeway and
not across lifeways. This misunderstanding promotes an expectation of
free normative interaction, occluding translation’s violence. Against such
an assumption, claims of incommensurability are easily cast as
conservative, protectionist, and backwards: as anti-change.195
The problem with perceiving claims of incommensurability as conservative or anti-change, as
Mills puts it, is that individuals who take approaches deemed to be more liberal may be trading a
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constitutional conversation for a line of reason that the other side (the state) will not (and
possibly cannot) hear.196

3.5 Legal Pluralism
Scholars of legal pluralism have done an admirable job of establishing a setting in which
to address concerns about the revitalization of Indigenous law in a context where the hierarchy of
the state has already been established. Legal pluralists, in a departure from the approach of legal
realists, rely on elements of normative judgements that give weight to participants to law, rather
than simply describe law as “whatever judges and lawyers happen to do.”197 It has been the great
project of legal pluralists to delve into the social realm of law in order to draw attention how law
is created and maintained through dynamic acts of interaction.198 As Brian Tamanaha writes,
“[l]egal pluralism is everywhere. There is, in every social arena one examines, a seeming
multiplicity of legal orders, from the lowest local level to the most expansive global level.”199 In
doing so, legal pluralists offer different modes for the recognition of multiple legal systems.
Examples can be drawn from the work of John Griffiths, who explains the difference between
strong and weak models of legal pluralism: strong legal pluralism refers to a context in which
multiple systems of law deriving from more than one source of authority are functioning; weak
legal pluralism describes a context in which multiple systems of law coexist on the basis of a
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single source of legal authority, which may also include formal hybridity.200 Even strong models,
however, present space for criticism.
There is less agreement among pluralists as to what law is than whether it can be plural.
Classic empirical legal pluralists argue that law can be distinguished from other social
phenomena through the identification of essential characteristics.201 Part of the trouble with the
application of any criteria designed to identify formal characteristics, however, is the application
of a lens designed by particular cultural, social, and historical conditions.202 What we view as an
‘essential’ characteristic of law privileges one worldview over others.203 Our understandings of
law are, as Val Napoleon writes, founded in our beliefs and subjective experience, rooted in our
formative understandings of relationships between people and the world.204 James [Sakéj]
Youngblood Henderson is highly critical of the inappropriate application of colonial concepts of
Indigenous law: “[o]ur diverse legal orders and consciousnesses are dismissed as imaginary and
not coercive enough to qualify as law. Our humanity and our very essence as human beings are
ignored in favor of failed Eurocentric models.”205 A critical post-modern legal pluralism is
arguably better suited to the consideration of the function of Indigenous law within Canada
because it provides more space for the consideration of the cultural contingencies of law.206
Even legal pluralism presents the issue of translation. Mills, in his discussion of
Anishinaabe constitutionalism, warns against a usage of legal pluralism that fails to understand

200

See John Griffiths, supra note 198.
Matthew Moulton provides an artful examination of schools of legal pluralists as he endeavours to find a postmodern model that might best suit Indigenous legal orders in Canada. For the beginning of his discussion of
empirical legal pluralists, see Matthew Moulton, supra note 122 at 41.
202
Ibid at 42.
203
Ibid at 58.
204
Val Napoleon, “Thinking About Indigenous Legal Orders,” in Colleen Sheppard and René Provost, eds,
Dialogues on Human Rights and Legal Pluralism (New York: Springer, 2013) at 235.
205
James [Sákéj] Youngblood Henderson, “Postcolonial Consciousness”, supra note 48 at 16.
206
Matthew Moulton, supra note 122 at 74.
201

54
the relationship between rooted constitutionalism and rooted law.207 For Mills, the analytic order
internal to Indigenous law is legality. This legality is comprised for four layers that do more than
consider “why such and such a normative proposition is or isn’t good law, but also and more
foundationally at how a community comes to have a concept of what law is and a view of its
purposes.”208 The legality of rooted constitutionalism does the same thing as a Western liberal
legality: “[explain] how creation stories yield up constitutional orders, how these in turn
authorize unique legal processes and institutions, and finally, how these legal traditions
ultimately produce a unique conception of law. That is, law is legitimate where the ascending
conditions of its empowerment and constraint internal to its own legality hold fast.”209 The
legality of Indigenous law, as Mills describes it, contains four levels: lifeworlds, lifeways, legal
traditions, and law.210 Rather than legal pluralism, Mills advocates for a theory of comparative
legality. The reason for this argument is to avoid a misinterpretation of the rootedness of
Indigenous constitutionalism.
The primary issue is one that we have already touched on in this chapter: that Indigenous
legal orders are not only different in content or sources of authority, but in their logic itself:
One may be able to translate distinct content across common logics, but
translating across distinct logics just makes no sense: a logic is by
definition the thing through which sense is made. Death awaits the spirit of
those traveling the negotiated or hybrid paths between lifeways because
eventually these travelers realize that in mixing content from distinct
lifeways, they’re allowing one of them to serve as the ground upon which
substantive difference across all of them is taken up. And in that moment
of abstruse translation’s sudden disclosure, the journey abruptly ends. The
traveller realizes she was never really there, has been stepping along
another path all along, flickers, and is gone.211
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Mills writes that legality difference not legal pluralism, is the space between the rooted law of
Indigenous peoples and liberal settlers.212 Thus, according to Mills, “we must choose either an
indigenous path or a settler one, and not some combination of the two.”213
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CHAPTER 4: ANISHINAABE CONSTITUTIONALISM
“We are not a creation of the Government of Canada or its Indian Act.”
-

Magnetawan First Nation Gchi-Naaknigewin, undated 214

“There have always been Anishinabe, and there will continue to be Anishinabe, who make these decisions
according to their understanding of Anishinabe law and of the ways that we were given.”
- Dawnis Kennedy (Minnawaanagogiizhigook), “Reconciliation without Respect? Section 35 and
Indigenous Legal Orders”, 2007 215

4.1 Introduction
Constitutionalism is an Anishinaabe legal tradition. At the beginning of this thesis, I
stressed this point, as well as that constitutionalism is more than just a written document
containing the basic principles, privileges, rights, and limitations of governments – it is a manner
of living.216 Traditionally, Indigenous constitutional structures resembled the customary legal
orders in which they were entangled, and so “[t]hey shifted, transformed, or retrenched in
accordance with the ebb and flow of political, economic, and social considerations at play across
the continent.”217 Of Anishinaabe constitutionalism in particular, Borrows writes that the
transient, decentralized, and contextual approach to power within Anishinaabe communities
“encouraged a constitutionalism which enhanced individual agency and decision-making
power.”218 It is constitutional thinking, as Stephen Cornell writes, that is more important than the
enactment of positive legislation.219
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A review of Anishinaabe constitutionalism and modern constitutions reinforces the
importance of Stephen Cornell’s reminder that constitutional thought, as hard-won and flexible
as it is, holds more significance than the written documents that may be produced as
representation of such thought. We focus, when examining constitutional traditions, on
fundamental questions:
What is the nation? What does it value? What is it trying to protect? What
kind of future is it trying to create? What kinds of relationships does it
wish to foster among its citizens, with its neighbors, with other
governments, and with the natural and spirit worlds? And what kinds of
governing tools—structures, systems, laws, processes—will such visions,
priorities, and concerns require? Answering these sorts of questions
requires constitutional thinking: What do we expect our governors to
protect, sustain, and exemplify, and how do we make that happen? How
do we constitute ourselves as an effective polity in contemporary times?220
To think constitutionally is to answer these questions in light of the core values, governing
principles, and goals of a government.221 Thus, the writing of a constitution becomes more of a
question of how a community communicates with itself about those answers.222
A modern written constitution is not necessary for the continuance of constitutional
orders, but the writing may be important. This is especially true in communities that have
become geographically and culturally diverse; it may have become too difficult to transmit a
constitutional tradition by traditional means (such as through storytelling or kinship
structures).223 A written constitution can act as “a critical reference point, a map of meanings and
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methods on the road to self-determination.”224 These documents may also represent an effort to
reconcile the different legal and constitutional orders that operate in Indigenous communities and
the state – a reconciliation that some legal scholars perceive as unwise, detrimental, or
impossible.225 More than that, they can represent a forward-looking effort to establish the
supremacy of Anishinaabe law in anticipating of changing relationships between Indigenous
nations and the state.

4.2 An Anishinaabe Constitutional Order
Constitutionalism is a way of life. In a more nuanced sense, “constitutionalism is the
logic and structure of how members of a people belong to one another.”226 The long-standing
Anishinaabe constitutional structure (found among doodems,227 traditions and customs, treaties,
etc.) is a functioning expression of this sentiment. Thus, as we consider the nature and function
of modern written Anishinaabe constitutions, we must also consider them within the context of a
Anishinaabe constitutional order.
Aaron Mills creates a useful earth-centred illustration of constitutional order. He paints
the image of a wooded area with different varieties of trees – poplar, maple, white birch, and oak
– and brings to our attention how the roots of the trees push deeply into the earth, holding each
tree in place. The trees grow solidly and extend their branches, further and further from their
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trunks, eventually producing leaves that “sing in the wind, which explode into colour in fall, and
finally which carpet the earth before biboon, winter, settles in, helping to renew earth once
again.”228 Mills’ description of the trees is so vivid as to call to our senses the smell of earth and
damp bark, or the whispers of soft leaves in the air. These living, breathing trees are his map for
the relationship between lifeworld and law:
The roots of a society are its lifeworld: the story it tells of creation, which
reveals what there is in the world and how we can know. Creation stories
disclose what a person is, what a community is, and what freedom looks
like. The trunk is a constitutional order: the structure generated by the
roots, which organizes and manifests these understandings as political
community. The branches are our legal traditions, the set of processes and
institutions we engage to create, sustain, and unmake law. The trunk
conditions the branches: it doesn't determine what they'll look like, but it
powerfully shapes them. A constitutional order similarly settles which legal processes are legitimate within it, but without ever determining a
necessary given set of processes as the legitimate ones. Subject to the
conditions the trunk will support, legal processes and their institutions may
vary considerably in object, scope, and means. Law, like leaves,
experiences a still higher level of conditioning. It's subject to the branches,
which are subject to the trunk, which is subject to what the roots will
bear.229
Each component is connected to the next and last. No component can exist independent of the
others. The connection between components is intimate, but never eliminates difference.230
There are many species of trees in these woods. They all grow strong in similar ways. It
is important to remember that no two trees are the same, even if they bear the marks of the same
species at the same age.231 Anishinaabe communities are like these trees: even where they might
have nearly identical constitutional structures, they will have differing laws232 (or even written
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expressions of that constitutional structure). What Mills wants to say is that, “every people is a
tree. We tell different stories of creation (even those of us who don't acknowledge doing so or
who explicitly disclaim a view of creation) and the story we tell powerfully conditions the
constitutional order we bring into being.”233 It is the constitutional order of peoples that shapes
their law.
This image might evoke, for those of us educated at Western legal institutions, the
celebrated imagining of Canada’s constitution as a “living tree”.234 What Aaron Mills calls to our
minds, however, is nothing like Canada’s ‘living tree’, which seems somehow to stand in
isolation. Mills’ trees are rooted and those “roots are buried in and wrapped tightly against
earth.”235 In an Anishinaabe constitutional order, “[a] lifeworld doesn't reflect the spontaneous
ideas of those standing within it. Our creation stories are of something common: the earth
beneath and all around us. What varies is how we understand it.”236 Indigenous people tell
different stories about creation and generate different bodies of law from those stories, but the
foundation of those lifeworlds is rooted in the earth.237
This rooted conception of Anishinaabe constitutionality is one without government.
Government (or collective enforcement action) becomes unnecessary in empowered Anishinaabe
communities238 when social cooperation is otherwise “sufficiently coordinated through the
constitutional logic of mutual aid, exercised through its correlate structure, kinship.”239 Mills
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appeals to a traditional approach to Anishinaabe constitutionalism that does not connect with the
production of modern written constitutional documents that are being produced by Anishinaabe
First Nations in Ontario. Modern Anishinaabe constitutions, as I will discuss, rather address the
role and restrictions of elected government and are adapted to the modern decisions and social
orders of Anishinaabe communities. The form of Anishinaabe constitutionalism as Mills
describes it is not, however, contrary to the modern movement toward ratified constitutions.
Rather, it functions as an undercurrent or parallel structure. Mills does not address written
constitutions, but instead focusses on constitutionalism as it is embodied by normative relations.
Constitutionalism, viewed through the logic of belonging, clarifies that it is “an act: something
done, not something had.”240 There is no distinct story of political formation – “community
always already is” while it is also “always becoming, a constellation of countless pieces, the
shifting connections between which are affirmed anew, time and again, through ongoing
practices of belonging.”241
The purpose of community rooted in this way is to pursue bimaadiziwin, or the Good
Life.242 To live in a good way is constant action, involving mutual aid and need within
communities. Bimaadiziwin is itself the potential of those actions in coordination with others and
the world around oneself. This is anything but easy when we consider, “the messiness and
imperfection of human, animal, plant, and spirit life as each of us struggles to balance our
interests with those of others.”243 As Eva Petoskey, a member of the Grand Traverse Band of
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Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, and a former Vice-Chair of the Grand Traverse Band
Tribal Council, described it, “when you say that, mino-bimaadziwin, you’re saying that a
person lives a life that has really dependently arisen within the web of life.”244 This
concept, Matthew Fletcher writes, was the foundational basis of traditional Anishinaabe society
and, implicitly, law and order.”245 To act fairly and in good faith is in line with minobimaadziwin.
This is not, of course, without exception. As Fletcher argues, there are examples of
traditional exceptions to this foundational order of life, as seen in the rare and extreme examples
of the banishment or execution of a lawbreaker.246 Stories of windigos - “an incredibly disturbing
creature known for its giant, humanoid form, ravenous appetites, and murderous cannibalism”247
– arise in instances where a lawbreaker (a murder or criminal) continues their criminal actions
without remorse or reform.248 The only known solution to a windigo is to kill the windigo.249 The
killing of a windigo, as recalled in a story from Sucker Clan of the Sandy Lake First Nation, was
a systematic and community-sanctioned affair – part of law and justice.250 Collective action is
part of correcting the course of community relations. Collective action is an expression of law; it
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is always a relational practice that intertwines one’s relationship to themselves and to those
around them.251 In this view, the Anishinaabe constitutional framework relies on kinship
structures and the customary growth of law based on the responsibilities of mutual aid that grow
through kinship.
Written Anishinaabe constitutions are notably absent from Aaron Mills’ description of an
Anishinaabe constitutional order. He directs his gaze to a traditional understanding of
constitutionalism among Anishinaabe communities that grows from the held hands of
community members. Constitutionalism is breathing, fluid, and responsive to social and
contextual changes. This image of Anishinaabe constitutionalism is one of indelibility; so long as
there remains connections to land, use of language, kindship ties, and community, so is there
constitutionalism at work. This form of constitutionalism is not vulnerable to outsiders. Indeed, it
can – and has – survived violent attempts on its life through cultural and familial disruption by
the state.
A rooted Anishinaabe constitutional order appears somewhat incompatible with a
positivist expression of Anishinaabe constitutionalism – at least, as described by Mills. The
difference, as he understands it, is that between an operational existence within existing social
structures that do not require a distinct political formation story and a society that necessarily
associates constitutionalism with a political community.252 For the latter, constitutionalism is
most critically to control governmental action: “constitutions (frequently, written constitutions)
are the higher laws which constrain governmental action to law, ensuring the government
doesn’t break the belonging analytic which undergirds its legitimacy.”253 This becomes less
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important when a society operates on contingencies, thereby distributing the powers to both
influence and comply with self-governing forces.254 And yet, Anishinaabe communities across
Ontario are producing and ratifying positivist constitutions on the foundation of traditional
Anishinaabe law as a means of self-empowerment.

4.3 An Agreement on Governance
The difficulty with an image of Anishinaabe constitutional order as described above is
the risk of idealizing philosophical points at the expense of the practical. I do not mean to
suggest that the revitalization or strengthening of this form constitutionalism is impractical –
simply that it is one component of how Anishinaabe communities choose to empower
themselves in a context where the state imposes governmental restraints that impact the
constitutional logics described by Mills, such as kinship structures. Apprehension of potentially
assimilationist models is well-warranted in a context where, for example, the federal
government’s 1969 White Paper255 called for the assimilation of Indigenous peoples into
Canadian liberal constitutionalism.256 What is not immediately clear on the face of this
discussion, however, is how modern written Anishinaabe constitutions relate to issues of
empowerment and assimilation.
There has been a popular move towards the drafting and ratification of written
Anishinaabe constitutions. The Anishinabek Nation,257 originally established as the Union of

254

Ibid. Mills is careful to note that there is some tension between certainty and contingency in all societies.
Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy,
1969 (First Session, Twenty-eighth Parliament, 1969).
256
Aaron Mills shows his apprehension of assimilationist models as the logic and structure of ‘reconciled’
Indigenous-settler communities. See Aaron Mills (Waabishki Ma’iingan), Miinigowiziwin, supra note 10 at 210.
257
The Anishinabek Nation was established as a legal entity for the purpose of entering legally-binding agreements
because the Anishinaabek nation did not otherwise have legal recognition by the state. This organization is a
political advocate for 39 First Nation communities in Ontario, with an approximate population of 65,000 citizens
(making up a third of Ontario’s First Nations population). The purpose of the Anishinabek Nation as an organization
255

65
Ontario Indians in 1949, is the organizing force behind the proliferation of constitutional
documents among Anishinaabe communities in Ontario. The organization strives toward the
restoration of Anishinaabe jurisdiction over all aspects of Anishinaabe life. This position was
cemented by the Anishinabek Grand Council Assembly’s adoption of the Anishinabek Nation
Declaration (“Declaration”) in 1980 in the context of Canada’s process of constitutional
repatriation, during which time Indigenous nations across Canada worked to renew their
relationship with the federal government. The 14 principles espoused in the Declaration were set
as the foundation for the development of the Anishinabek Nation and its governing practices.
Key principles assert inherent Anishinaabe jurisdiction and sovereignty:
1. We are Nations. We have always been Nations.
2. As Nations, we have inherent rights which have never been given up.
3. We have the right to our own forms of government.
4. We have the right to determine our own citizens.
5. We have the right to self-determination.
6. We, through our governments, shall have full control of our land.
“Land” includes water, air, minerals, timber and wildlife.
7. We wish to remain within Canada, but within a revised constitutional
framework.
…
14. Neither the federal government of Canada nor any provincial
government shall unilaterally affect the rights of our Nations or our
Citizens.258
The assertions made within the Declaration are in strong opposition to de facto state governance
in Anishinaabe communities via the Indian Act. The principles replicated above inform federal
and provincial governments that the Anishinaabek people are an assertion their rights of self-
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determination and self-governance. The Declaration is a definition of the Anishinaabek as a
nation.
The principles of the Declaration contributed to the development of governing and
advocacy strategies in the years moving toward the negotiation of a governance agreement
between the Anishinabek Nation and Canada in 2019.259 With a Framework Agreement on
Governance signed between the Anishinabek Nation and Canada signed on November 26, 1998,
the development of the Anishinabek Nation Governance Agreement (“ANGA”) was set in
motion. There is no requirement by the Crown for First Nations entering “self-governance”
agreements with the Crown to adopt internal constitutions. Nevertheless, the development of
community constitutions became integral to the pursuit of the ANGA. The reason for the
incorporation of constitutionalism is the idea that Anishinaabe communities would require their
own means of organizing governance and developing law if they were going to displace the
guiding hand of the state. A popular view echoing among Anishinabek Nation member citizens
was that constitutions were a desirable means of exercising the Anishinaabe right to selfdetermination and – at least, theoretically – one that would force Canada’s recognition of that
right.260
There was a flurry of constitution-building activity among Anishinabek Nation member
communities in the early 2000s, from the establishment of the Constitution Development Project
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(which included community consultations to develop the Anishinaabe Chi-Naaknigewin and
individual community constitutions) and a series of constitutional development workshops.261
Following the adoption and ceremonial proclamation of the Anishinaabe Chi-Naknigewin in
2012, vigorous efforts to assist with the completion and finalization of individual member
communities’ constitutional documents began. Negotiation of the ANGA was well underway and
time was running out in anticipation of the completion of the umbrella governance agreement,
which would trigger citizen engagement and voting (to begin in 2020).262
Only member communities with ratified constitutions that have been approved by the
Anishinabek Nation are eligible to vote on the adoption of the governance agreement.263 The
number of ratified (or even draft) constitutions in Anishinaabe communities in Ontario is
uncertain. An estimate264 by the Anishinabek Nation is that, as of May 16, 2019, 27 First Nations
members of the organization had ratified constitutions.265 This estimate represents less than 70
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percent of Anishinabek Nation member communities. In my research, I have been able to locate
15 constitutional documents: ten ratified constitutions, one of which is the Anishinaabe ChiNaaknigewin (the overarching constitutional document for the whole of the Anishinaabe nation,
which I treat as analogous to community constitutions), four draft constitutions, and one labeled
a ‘final draft’.266 Given that the Anishinabek Nation provides templates and assistance to
communities that want to ratify constitutions and that they require the Anishinabek Nation’s
stamp of approval, ratified documents will be considered to be representative of the modern
written Anishinaabe constitutional framework in Ontario.
This is not to say, however, that Anishinaabe First Nations communities who are
members of the Anishinabek Nation and have ratified constitutions must vote on and adhere to
the umbrella governance agreement. Though the ratification vote on the ANGA has been
postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been at least one community with a
constitution reviewed for this thesis that has chosen not to participate in that ratification vote.
Feedback from within the Chippewas of the Thames First Nation community revealed concerns
that the umbrella agreement would simply turn the Anishinabek Nation into an external
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government.267 Indeed, criticisms of the umbrella agreement include that it forces Anishinaabe
governance into harmony with Canadian law. For example, it would allow communities to
control membership, but not make decisions about Indian Status under the still operable Indian
Act.268 Finally, both federal and provincial laws would continue to apply on First Nations reserve
land. Brock Pitawanakwat, in his review for the Yellowhead Institute, draws attention to
reference within the umbrella agreement to the continued prevalence of a federal law over the
law of a First Nation or the ANGA itself where that law is “a federal law in relation to peace,
order and good government, criminal law, the protection of the health and safety of all
Canadians, the protection of human rights or other matters of overriding national importance.”269
And so, even though the purpose of the agreement is promoted as the restoration of
Anishinaabeg jurisdiction, state law and its interpretive powers remain paramount.
Advocates for the ANGA argue that the agreement extends Anishinaabeg jurisdiction and
that it provides protection for culture and language. As we will discuss, these are key elements of
Anishinaabe constitutions. There is, however, criticism that the ANGA does not go far enough.
First Nations’ jurisdiction would be expanded just beyond the boundaries of that found within
the Indian Act and may not provide equivalent benefits than a First Nations gains if it proves
Aboriginal title recognition.270 Assertions of language revitalization are undercut by the
requirement within the agreement that the Anishinabek Nation “establish and maintain an official
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registry of its laws in English and, at the discretion of the Anishinabek Nation, in
Anishinaabemowin.”271 A more daunting concern for those who seek the revitalization of
Anishinaabe law and restoration of jurisdiction is that the law-making powers are “circumscribed
by liberal values throughout the agreement.”272 Though ratified Anishinaabe constitutions do not
contain elements that express their operable dependence on the ratification of the ANGA, their
subordination to the agreement, if adopted, undermines the many articles that assert broader lawmaking jurisdiction.273

4.4 A New Framework for Traditional Governance
Modern democratic constitutions serve as a lens into the societies that produce them. In
practical terms, these documents contain five primary elements: first, a discussion of the nature
of democracy and the resulting structure of the government; second, clarification of individual
and collective rights; third, explanation of the rights and duties of citizenship; fourth, explanation
of the role of constitutional courts, and fifth, an amending formula.274 This is the formula
advocated for the examination of Indigenous constitutions, generally, by Christopher Alcantara
and Greg Whitfield. Anishinaabe constitutions can be observed to possess these elements, but the
elements themselves deserve some attention before we turn our eye to document analysis.
The first category, a discussion of the nature of democracy and the resulting structure of
the government, tends to be complex. This element contains views on how the structure will be
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both representative and able to accommodate differences, reflect the history and values of the
people while also able to achieve public goals.275 Aiming toward reasonable understandability by
all members of the society, a focus is placed on creating balance between “tradition, democracy,
and efficiency”.276 The second element of constitutional development, which concerns individual
and collective rights, can include everything from the rights of individuals to the protection of
their freedoms from the interference of the state277 to rights such as health care and education.278
The requirements and duties of citizenship – the third element – tends in Western
traditions to be narrowly defined to those citizens granted the definition by place of birth or
parentage.279 There are, of course, extensions to the boundaries of citizenship from society to
society, though granting citizenship by more than a single generation of removal is
comparatively rare in Western traditions. The duties and rights attached to citizenship vary
widely and may include those items such as compulsory jury duty or open-ended periods of
military service, or mandatory voting.280 The role of constitutional courts (or the role of the
judiciary and advisory councils, more broadly) comprises the fourth constitutional element. This
element may include the definition of a separate constitutional court or apply more generally to
the judicial oversight, tasked with ensuring that the constitution remains whole and abided by in
the creation and application of law. The fifth and final element, which governs constitutional
amendments, is vital to ensuring that a constitution remains adaptable in changing circumstances
and that it is always responsive to the will of the people. Formulae for amendments are often
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provided and tend to favour constitutional stability, thereby requiring large majorities to validate
amendments.281
While I use this basic formula produced by Alcantara and Whitfield for the empirical
examination of Indigenous constitutions in a context where it might be useful to examine their
comparison to Western constitutional traditions, it is also important to keep in mind that these
specifications favour constitutional development insofar as it adheres to Western traditions.
Alcantara and Whitfield acknowledge this, but state that Indigenous constitutions must to some
extent reflect Western constitutions because they exist within the constitutional framework of
Canada.282 Thus, I offer the following as additional criteria to consider in such a study, as
provided by Donald Lutz. While Lutz does not profess himself to be an expert on Indigenous
constitutionalism, the framework that he provides is highly adaptable to Indigenous
constitutions. Lutz’ defining constitutional framework is presented in broad categories that
encompass the elements of Anishinaabe constitutions without an implied expectation that the
documents tick all of the precise boxes that we would expect of a Western state-centred
constitution. This, along with the inclusion of traditional societies in his analysis, is why I favour
his categorical constitutional analysis.
Constitutions worthy of their name, Lutz argues, contain three foundational elements:
culture, power, and justice.283 The cultural element – the first in Lutz’ formula – appeals to
Aristotle’s characterization of constitutions as documents defining “a way of life in general terms
by laying out and using as organizing principles the values, major assumptions, and definitions
of justice toward which a people aspire.”284 The cultural element is wide-ranging and includes a
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variety of components expressed in many ways. Definitions of citizenship or the characterisation
of who belongs to the people or nation are a foundational example of this element.285 High levels
of explicit cultural content can be found in constitutions adopted by more traditional societies.286
Power is the second element of constitutions as presented by Donald Lutz. This element
is found within the decision-making institutions within the constitution. In a coherent
constitution, institutions organizing power are dependent on culture and accomplish multiple
goals.287 The power element creates structures to manage conflict to avoid violence. It does so by
identifying a supreme power that is always determinative and distributes that power in a manner
that promotes effective decision-making over a broad range of issues.288 The third and final
element, connected to elements of culture and power, is justice. Justice is the key element; after
all, as Lutz writes, “[c]onstitutionalism as a political technology attempts to marry power with
justice. It attempts to do so in a variety of ways.”289 The purpose of a written constitution is to
represent relatively predictable decision-making processes that serve to limit power.290
The framework of constitutional development provided by Lutz makes space for the
inclusion of the specifications described by Alcantara and Whitfield, but in a manner that allows
for more fluidity. Thus, I will structure my empirical analysis of a sample set of Anishinaabe
constitutions in Ontario according to Lutz’s framework, but with reference to the framework
provided by Alcantara and Whitfield. This approach will be more adaptable to the recognition of
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traditional Anishinaabe law as it appears within modern constitutions than an examination of
these documents through a lens coloured by Western constitutions. Looking at Anishinaabe
constitutions with wider eyes is important because, though they may exist within the broader
framework of the Canadian constitutional framework, these are distinct documents designed to
give meaningful life to local culture.291

The First Element: Culture
Culture is foundational to constitutional development. As an element of constitutional
design, culture predates written constitutionalism. Culture contributes to constitutional
development, which, in turn, contributes back to culture. Culture is identifiable in many
components of constitutions, including the definition of membership, shared stories of creation,
and expressed community values. Culture can be seen in general or specific terms, such as
constitutional preambles or individual rights. It is no surprise that the cultural element is
dominant in the constitutional documents produced by Anishinaabe communities in Ontario,
given that Indigenous nations so regularly find themselves in disputes over culture-based
practices with the settler-colonial state. The prominence of traditional culture and law within
these constitutions aligns the majority of Anishinaabe constitutions within the sample set with
Donald Lutz’s categorization of traditional societies.292
The inclusion of Anishinaabemowin is a significant cultural element within the
constitutions reviewed as part of this study. As explained in Chapter 3.3, language is itself
intertwined with ecology, kinship, and the revitalization of Indigenous legal orders. Language
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reveals understandings of the world that inform relationships and responsibilities.293 The
significance of language to the preservation of knowledge, ways of knowing, and understandings
of the world place it as a cornerstone sacred, inalienable right.294 Every ratified Anishinaabe
constitution reviewed as part of this empirical study contains recognition of the importance of
Anishinaabemowin. There are, however, some interesting variations in how this recognition
manifests.
The Anishinaabe language is included as the official language of each community and of
the Anishinabek Nation, sometimes alongside English and other times with priority over English.
For example, the Anishinaabe Chi-Naaknigewin, the supreme law of the Anishinabek Nation
generally, lists Anishinaabemowin as the official language of the nation with English serving as
a second language.295 The Nipissing Gichi-Naaknigewin296 and the Biigtigong Nishnaabeg GchiNaaknigewin provide the same recognition, with the later categorizing English as “the working
language”297 of the First Nation. Interestingly, however, these community-produced documents
contain scarce use of Anishinaabemowin within their text.298 While a few constitutions contain
Anishinaabemowin versions of Ngo Dwe Waangizid Anishinaabe , or “One Anishinaabe
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Family”,299 only the Deshkan Ziibiing Anishinaabe Aki Chi-Inaakonigewin300 is written in
Anishinaabemowin (with translations into English). The full publication of the Deshkan Ziibiing
Anishinaabe Aki Chi-Inaakonigewin in Anishinaabemowin before English serves three purposes:
first, it is a demonstration of the priority that Anishinaabe constitutions place on the
revitalization and protection of Anishinaabemowin despite the rarity of fluent speakers;301
second, the document preserves Anishinaabe worldviews and understandings of specific terms
by first including those terms in the language;302 third, the fluid use of Anishinaabemowin
provides access to language-speakers and promotes Anishinaabemowin literacy among members
as the community pursues immersive language learning.303
The right to learn and speak Anishinaabemowin intersects with the inclusion of
individual and community rights and responsibilities, as described by Alcantara and Whitfield. In
their study of West Coast Indigenous constitutions, Alcantara and Whitfield identify first-,
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second-, and third-generation rights. First-generation rights (“political, legal, property, and
conscience”) are common elements of democratic constitutions.304 Of the ten ratified
Anishinaabe constitutions I studied, four had enumerated individual rights,305 one references
members’ entitlement to the rights and freedoms provided by the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms instead of enumerating rights, and five (including the general constitution of the
Anishinabek Nation) exclude direct mention of individual rights.306 The right to learn and speak
Anishinaabemowin is an enumerated individual right contained in three of the four constitutions
that contain such enumerations.307 The right to live in a manner in keeping with one’s Indigenous
traditions308 and to freely practice one’s spirituality or religion309 also take the role of highly
cultural enumerated rights.
Each of the ratified Anishinaabe constitutions that contain enumerated individual rights
include rights that are otherwise commonplace in democratic constitutions. Rights of political
participation are the apparent focus of the constitutional drafters, with reference to rights to
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“participate in the public decision-making processes”310 and participate in the selection of the
leadership311 of each First Nation. These rights are expressed in largely uniform language.312 The
freedom of non-political speech is a rarity, only held as an individual right in the Deshkan
Ziibiing Anishinaabe Aki Chi-Inaakonigewin,313 which notably reproduces other rights and
freedoms comparable to those found in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, such as
the freedom of peaceful assembly314 or the freedom of association.315 Though not always stated
in the constitutions reviewed, the absence of these rights and freedoms, which we expect in a
modern democratic constitution, might be the result of an assumed or stated reliance on the
applicability of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.316
Equal access to services and provisions, what Alcantara and Whitfield call secondgeneration rights, are a notable feature in modern Anishinaabe constitutions. Each of the four
ratified constitutions containing enumerated rights contain such provisions. The language
310
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expressing these rights varies a little more than expression of political rights, with phrases such
as that in the Wiikwemkoong Gchi-Naaknigewin, which provides for the “right to apply for
programs and services” and to be “served by the administration, boards, committees, and other
entities… in a manner that is free from discrimination or arbitrary decision…”317 Others use the
language of “fair and equal” access to programs and services.318 Thus, the language used
guarantees access, but does not specify services or guarantee an adequate standard for those
services.319
Alcantara and Whitfield observe that third-generation rights, which include rights to a
healthy environment or commitments to an improved economy, tend to be less common in nonIndigenous democratic constitutions than they are in Indigenous constitutions.320 This is
demonstrable in modern democratic Anishinaabe constitutions in Ontario. For example, three of
the four ratified constitutions containing enumerated rights include the right to practice one’s
Aboriginal and treaty rights to harvest the gifts provided by the Creator in a “sustainable
manner”.321 More general calls are made in constitutions without enumerated rights, such as in
the Nipissing Gichi-Naaknigewin, for conduct according to “principles of sustainability and
preservation of natural resources for generations.”322 Two constitutions make explicit that
economic development is a priority of the ratifying First Nations, calling for a balance between
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sustainable natural practices and “interests of pursuing economic advancement”323 or to maintain
a “sustainable economy”.324 The presence of these components more commonly in Anishinaabe
constitutions rather than democratic constitutions, generally, is logical in a context where First
Nations economic growth has been hindered by the state.
The responsibilities of citizenship or membership are fairly consistent in both ratified and
draft constitutional documents. Rather than place strict constraints on the behaviour of
individuals (or, more broadly, the community), responsibilities are framed as guidance.325 Unlike
enumerated individual rights, found in only four of ten ratified constitutions, responsibilities are
more broadly distributed with declarations of a commitment to protecting an Anishinaabe way of
life and stewardship over the land, waters, and resources. Individuals are not held to specific
standards of conduct but rather find themselves within broader directions to the community.
These directions can appear strict, but leave room for broad interpretation and generally lack
references to sanctions. For example, in the Wiikwemkoong Gchi-Naaknigewin, direction is given
that the community “shall honour and abide by our Anishinabeaadziwin through the values of
our Seven Grandfather teachings…”326 The use of the word shall indicates a required action, but
the requirement made is aspirational and contains no specific enforcement power.327
Definitions of citizenship, categorized by Donald Lutz as a foundational component of
the cultural element of constitutions, are included in a handful of Anishinaabe constitutions.
More specifically, it is the right of First Nations to define their own citizenship or membership
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that is asserted in constitutional documents. Only four of nine constitutions328 ratified by First
Nations communities contain pointed assertions of the right of the community to define its own
citizenry or membership.329 Matters of citizenship are contained within statements on
jurisdiction330 or may be more distinctly directed toward processes for the determination of
citizenship. For example, legislative authority to both define and determine Atikameksheng
Anishnawbek Debendaagziwaad331 is asserted in the Atikameksheng Anishnawbek GchiNaaknigewin.332 The Nipissing Gichi-Naaknigewin, using the same Anishinaabemowin
terminology, asserts the “exclusive jurisdiction” of the First Nation to “make laws for
determining Debendaagziwaad.333 The use of the term Debendaagziwaad is significant; the
communities describing themselves in Anishinaabemowin take control of the term and definition
from the hands of the state. Belonging becomes more than ‘citizenship’ or ‘membership’ as
Eurocentric minds might interpret it. The interpretation of the entity over which the community
asserts jurisdiction becomes the authority of the community itself.334
A high level of cultural expression in modern Anishinaabe constitutions can be found in
declarations of Anishinaabe culture, connection with lands and waters, guiding principles of life,
and citizenship itself. This goes beyond the use of Anishinaabemowin terms. The Deshkan
Ziibiing Anishinaabe Aki Chi-Inaakonigewin, for example, includes the following as equal
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citizens before the law: “fish, rocks, plants, flyers, crawlers and four-legged beings”.335 The
Deshkan Ziibiing Anishinaabe Aki Chi-Inaakonigewin is the only constitutional document in my
study, ratified or in draft format, that defines non-human citizens of the community. This is an
explicit recognition of significant relationships between the community and its ecology and
implies the existence of reciprocal responsibilities between humans and non-human entities.336
To include non-human citizens, “equal before and under the law, without discrimination or
prejudice” contrasts with the state’s legal prioritization of humans and aligns with Anishinaabe
values to acknowledge all living things as “worthy of respect, honour and dignity.”337 This
stewardship relationship is an integral part of Anishinaabe law.338
The enjoyment and protection of Anishinaabe culture is an expressed value or
responsibility in all of the 15 constitutional documents studied. A communal commitment to the
continuance of Anishinaabe culture can be found both within constitutional preambles and
articles. Though the language in these constitutions varies with reference to future generations, it
generally echoes that found in the Anishinaabe Chi-Naaknigewin, which asserts the right to enact
laws “in order to protect and preserve Anishinaabe culture, languages, customs, traditions, and
practices for the betterment of the Anishinabek.”339 Variations include: a statement on the
encouragement and practice of traditions and the traditional way of life;340 a commitment to
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“honour and abide by our Anishinabeaadziwin”;341 a protected right to living in a manner in
keeping with tradition,342 and an affirmation that the constitutional document is “consistent with
the values, principles and spiritual beliefs upon which our lives are based.”343 A stated
commitment to mino-bimaadiziwin (“to live, to teach, and to embrace Anishinaabemwin and
Anishinaabe aadzowin”)344 falls within the same category.

The Second Element: Power
Power, the second element of a constitution in Donald Lutz’ framework, relies on culture
in coherent constitutions. Such a constitution identifies a supreme power and distributes that
power among organizing institutions. Modern Anishinaabe constitutions in Ontario meet this
specification by Lutz. In my review, I found two categories of power within the surveyed
constitutions: inward-looking sources of power and outward-looking sources of power. Within
the inward-looking category are inherent rights, sometimes with reference to spiritually granted
rights. The outward-looking category includes treaties, the Canadian Constitution, and the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.345 Most modern Anishinaabe
constitutions contain references to both categories of power.
Inward-looking sources of power are the express sources of power in modern
Anishinaabe constitutions.346 This is perhaps unsurprising in light of the strong emphasis they
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place on cultural practice and protection. Every ratified or draft document that I reviewed
contains reference to inherent rights. It is common for First Nations to assert their inherent rights
on the basis of having lived on and governed over their lands, “as [their] ancestors have since
time immemorial.”347 Statements that the First Nation has never “ceded, surrendered, or in any
way extinguished”348 their rights and interest in the land and waters349 of their territories serves
as a foundation for the inherent right of self-government.350 This is a source of power that
appeals to logic in Indigenous or Western legal traditions, as will be discussed in relation to the
Canadian constitution as an external source of power.
The inclusion of spiritually-granted inherent rights to self-governance and connections
with one’s ecology is a remarkable feature of modern Anishinaabe constitutions. The Creator is a
source of rights and responsibilities in traditional law. Eight of ten ratified constitutional
documents reviewed refer to the Creator or spiritually granted rights. All five draft constitutions
contain such references.351 Some overlap between length of the relationship between the people
and the ecology and the spiritual realm is provided because it is the Creator who placed people
on the land to uphold their “sacred obligations”.352 The Creator is credited as the source of the
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inherent right of self-governance, having “bestowed the right to enact any laws necessary in
order to protect and preserve Anishinaabe culture, languages, customs, traditions, and practices
for the betterment of the Anishinabek.”353 This right is sometimes framed as a responsibility, as
in the Pic Mobert First Nation Chi-Naaknigewin, in which the community is stated to be
“responsible for preserving and protecting our inherent rights, our values, our language and our
culture for future generations.”354 In other documents, such as in the Nipissing GichiNaaknigewin, the Creator is credited as the source of the right to self-government as well as all
natural gifts, for which the Anishinaabe are responsible for caring and harvesting only in a
sustainable manner.355 Each person is tasked with stewardship of the land, part of “sacred trust”
from the Creator to protect the natural environment.356
We now turn to outward-looking sources of power referenced in modern Anishinaabe
constitutions. Unlike inward-looking sources of power, outward-looking sources of power sit
(mostly) beyond the boundaries of traditional Anishinaabe law, with the exception being treaties.
Outward-looking sources of power (treaties, the Canadian Constitution, and the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples) operate alongside and are dependent upon
inward-looking sources of power. The ability to enter treaties, to gain recognition of Aboriginal
title and rights under section 35(1) of the Canadian Constitution Act, 1982,357 and to fall within
the purview of the UNDRIP all depend upon the pre-existence of an Anishinaabe legal order.
Eight of ten ratified constitutions I reviewed contain references to outward-looking sources of
power. Of those eight, six constitutional documents refer to treaties as both continuing legal
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commitments and sources of rights.358 Treaty rights are referred to in general terms with little
exception.359
References to the Canadian Constitution often coincide with treaty references due to the
recognition of treaty rights under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. Seven of ten
ratified Anishinaabe constitutions reviewed contain references to the Canadian Constitution. 360
These references are most commonly made either in reference to the applicability of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms or in reference to Aboriginal title and rights in their
preambles. The language tends to be a brief affirmation of existing Aboriginal title, rights, and
treaty rights under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.361 As an outward-looking source
of power, the Canadian Constitution can be better understood as an affirmation of rights
otherwise grounded in inward-looking sources of power, rather than as a source of Indigenous
authority.
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples serves a similar
function as an outward-looking source of power that affirms Anishinaabe rights of selfgovernance rather than establish them. Articles 3 and 4 of the UNDRIP are cited as particularly
important in this regard: Article 3 as recognition of the right of Indigenous peoples to self-
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determination and by virtue of that right to freely determine their political status and pursue
economic, social, and cultural development; Article 4 as recognition of the right of Indigenous
peoples, by virtue of their right to self-determination, to autonomy or self-government in matters
that relate to their internal or local affairs, as well as means of financing those affairs.362 The
UNDRIP recognizes the inherent rights of Indigenous peoples, based in their own legal
traditions.
References to the UNDRIP are pointed toward the state and the ratifying First Nation.
First Nations are careful to note that Canada joined other countries in April of 2016 to finally
support the UNDRIP and reaffirm the commitment of the state to promote and protect the rights
of Indigenous peoples.363 By noting Canada’s commitment to the UNDRIP in their constitutional
documents, Anishinaabe communities are calling on Canada to uphold the document at home
and abroad. These constitutional documents are an assertion of inherent rights that demand a
changing relationship between Canada and the state. References to the authority of UNDRIP are
also, however, a declaration by ratifying First Nations that they will uphold the rights of their
citizens/members. This declaration is made in specific terms by Deshkan Ziibiing (Chippewas of
the Thames First Nation) in the Deshkan Ziibiing Anishinaabe Aki Chi-Inaakonigewin at Article
10.3: “Deshkan Ziibiing Anishinaabe Aki will adhere to the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples and uphold the rights its citizens possess against their own and
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other governments.”364 Such a declaration takes ownership of ethical governance, toward an
international “gold standard” of rights recognition.365
Assertions of exclusive jurisdiction and inherent rights to self-governance ensure that
inward-looking sources of power take precedence over outward-looking sources of power. It is
worth emphasizing once more that outward-looking sources of power are only cited as
supportive of inherent, inward-looking Anishinaabe rights.366 While all modern Anishinaabe
constitutions assert the right of the ratifying First Nation to enact laws concerning its community
and territory, four ratified constitutions assert exclusive law-making authority. This is not to
suggest that those First Nations that did not include specific provisions on exclusive law-making
powers did not intend the implication.367 The language used to express the primacy of inwardlooking sources of power varies, and includes references to “exclusive jurisdiction”368 and “sole
jurisdiction”.369 An even stronger assertion of jurisdiction is made in the Deshkan Ziibiing
Anishinaabe Aki Chi-Inaakonigewin at Artcle 11.3: “Deshkan Ziibiing Anishinaabe Ai ChiInaakonigewin is paramount over the Canadian Constitution and the Constitutions of other
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sovereign Nations.”370 Though there is no mechanism nor venue suggested for the enforcement
this asserted paramountcy, this a strong statement on a commitment to community development
of and adherence to laws that align with their own constitution.
The inclusion of a list of law-making powers is a fairly common element in the
constitutional documents reviewed. These powers are expressed with some variation, but there is
a general consensus among ratifying and drafting First Nations on their jurisdiction over: citizen
health and well-being, education, the protection of human rights, definitions of community
citizenship and associated rights, the protection of lands and waters, culture (including language
and traditions), economic development, and social development (including child and family
services).371 While some of the enumerated areas of jurisdiction align with the authority given to
Band Councils to enact by-laws under the Indian Act,372 others are broader reaching. For
example, jurisdiction is claimed over criminal law and procedure, taxation, natural resource
activities (fishing, forestry, and mining), and family matters (including marriage, divorce,
adoption, and child custody) in article 16 of the Biigtigong Nishnaabeg Gchi-Naaknigewin.373
Similar jurisdictional assertions are made in article 5 of the Deshkan Ziibiing Anishinaabe Aki
Chi-Inaakonigewin over taxation, wills and estates, matrimonial real property, child welfare, and
regulation and licensing of businesses and corporations.374 The jurisdiction expressed overlaps

370

Chippewas of the Thames First Nation, Deshkan Ziibiing Anishinaabe Aki Chi-Inaakonigewin, supra note 300 at
art 11.3.
371
Five ratified constitutions and one draft constitution include jurisdictional lists. See: Chippewas of the Thames
First Nation, Deshkan Ziibiing Anishinaabe Aki Chi-Inaakonigewin, supra note 300 at art 5; Mississauga First
Nation, Misswezahging Debaakinagewin Naakinagewin, supra note 305 at art 11; Atikameksheng Anishnawbek
First Nation, Atikameksheng Anishnawbek Gchi-Naaknigewin, supra note 305 at art 8, and; Pic River First Nation,
Biigtigong Nishnaabeg Gchi-Naaknigewin, supra note 297 at art 16.
372
Some examples are traffic regulation, health regulation (to some extent), and reserve residency. See Indian Act,
RSC, 1985, c. I-5, s.81(1).
373
Pic River First Nation, Biigtigong Nishnaabeg Gchi-Naaknigewin, supra note 297 at art 16.
374
Chippewas of the Thames First Nation, Deshkan Ziibiing Anishinaabe Aki Chi-Inaakonigewin, supra note 300 at
art 5.

90
that of the provincial and federal governments of Canada. The inclusion of enumerated lawmaking powers appears to be meant, then, to claim jurisdiction over areas that have otherwise
been taken from the control of First Nations’ Band Councils by the Indian Act.
As well as law-making power, the assertion of jurisdictional rights often includes
territorial rights with the “environmental protection of natural resources”375 as a focal point. Such
assertions of jurisdiction reflect the legal relationship between Anishinaabe communities and
ecology as discussed above.376 The Pic Mobert First Nation Chi-Naaknigewin provides an
example of this overlap at article 8: “The Pic Mobert First Nation has the inherent right bestowed
by the creator to enact any laws it believes are necessary to protect and preserve our Anishinaabe
culture, to protect our lands and waters, our language, customs, traditions and practices…”377
Here, territorial jurisdiction is implied in a manner that evidences the entwined nature of
Anishinaabe life and territory. The protection of each of these things is the protection of all of
these things. Of course, more explicit assertions of territorial jurisdiction are made in ratified
constitutions, such as in the Aamjiwnaang Chi’Naaknigewin, which asserts at article 3: “Our
jurisdiction covers our Bendaazig378 and our traditional territory.”379 The responsibility of a
community to the “protection and management of the land, air, water, lake beds, and all
resources”380 is related to the assertion of some communities of “inherent rights and title to all
water ways”381 and lands of their historical territories.
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Sources of power recognized in modern Anishinaabe constitutions are diffuse and
hierarchical, with local law given primacy over the law of other Indigenous nations or the state.
This is observable in the relationship between Anishinaabe constitutions themselves as well as in
the relationship with the Crown as asserted by Anishinaabe First Nations. The umbrella
Anishinaabe constitutional document, the Anishinaabe Chi-Naaknigewin, contains the
recognition that, while “Anishinabek Nation laws and Anishinabek First Nation laws are equally
operative,” it is the local law of individual First Nations that “will take precedence” in cases of
difference or conflict.382 At least two ratified constitutions express a relational recognition of the
primacy of their own constitutional law over the constitutional law of either the Anishinabek
Nation383 or other nations (including Canada), generally.384
It is significant to note, as Alcantara and Whitfield do, that “most sovereign states do not
cast self-determination and territorial control in the language of constitutional rights because they
believe there are no overarching or external entities that can legally interfere in their affairs.”385
References to inward-looking and outward-looking sources of power can be interpreted as
responses to external threats, “namely the Canadian federal, provincial, and territorial
governments.”386 References to the length of territorial occupation and inherent rights granted by
the Creator stand in opposition to trends of land dispossession in Canadian law. The strongest
statement on external threats to the jurisdiction of the First Nation are found in the Deshkan
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Ziibiing Anishinaabe Aki Chi-Inaakonigewin. In the preamble of this document, attempts at
colonization are formally recognized as violations: “Whereas, we, the Peoples of Deshkan
Ziibing Anishinaabe Aki recognize the injustices flowing from Canada’s attempts to colonize our
lands and people, we wish to forge healthy, respectful relationships with other Nations, Canada,
Ontario, and local governments.”387 With the recognition of external threats comes a statement of
expected relations between the First Nation and Canada moving forward.
Turning the eye inward, every modern Anishinaabe constitutional document provides
implicit visions of democracy in its focus on the composition of local government and the
relationship between its government and citizens.388 For example, article 7.4 of the
Atikameksheng Anishnawbek Gchi-Naaknigewin states that the elected government has the
“moral and legal responsibility to conduct their affairs in office” in a matter that respects the best
interests of the community, promotes peace and unity, is cooperative and honest, upholds the
constitution, protects treaty and inherent rights, provides for accountable decision-making, and
provides fair and equitable access to public programming.389 The Misswezahging
Debaakinagewin Naakinagewin and Deshkan Ziibiing Anishinaabe Aki Chi-Inaakonigewin
require the same governmental promotion of peace and accountable decision making while also
emphasizing that the local government must strive to respect, honour, and abide by the seven
grandfather teachings.390 These statements are representative of the general articulation of
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expectations of governance in the constitutional documents reviewed. Included are both
references to specifically Anishinaabe legal expectations (adherence to the seven grandfather
teachings) and general democratic values such as transparency, accountability, and
effectiveness.391
Articles on the financial administration of First Nations are commonly included in
modern Anishinaabe constitutions.392 These articles reflect the same democratic values expressed
within those determining local governance, though the specifics of financial administration may
vary. Prized are the requirement that those charged with administering the First Nation’s funds
be prudent, transparent, and accountable, and that they preserve and protect community funds
while making effective and efficient use of those resources.393 Where communities do not
express these democratic values in association with their financial administration, they imply
them with terms that require community access and participation in budget hearings, as well as
audits.394
Constitutional amendment processes are the final component of the element of power in
modern Anishinaabe constitutions and are included in every constitutional document reviewed in
this study.395 Amendment requirements vary across the documents, but all require a majority of
some kind to validate a constitutional amendment. The basis of the required majority is either the
total number of eligible voters in the First Nation or the total number of cast/accepted ballots.
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Only three First Nations with ratified constitutions base the required majority vote on the total
number of eligible voters, with the Biigtigong Nishnaabeg Gchi-Naaknigewin396 and
Aamjiwnaang Chi’Naaknigewin,397 requiring affirmative votes by more than fifty percent of
eligible voters, and the Deshkan Ziibiing Anishinaabe Aki Chi-Inaakonigewin,398 requiring a
supermajority of at least sixty percent of the total community membership. These are relatively
high standards.
Most of the constitutional documents however can be amended at a lower standard of
voter assent. For example, both the Misswezahging Debaakinagewin Naakinagewin399 and
Beausoleil First Nation Constitution for Education400 may be amended if at least fifty-one
percent of thirty percent of the eligible voters of the First Nations cast affirmative ballots.
Amendments to the Wiikwemkoong Gchi-Naaknigewin require an unusual mix of a more than
seventy-five percent majority of the elected Council and more than fifty-one percent of accepted
ballots,401 thereby ensuring that both elected government and a majority of membership approve
any constitutional changes. The amendment procedure of the Pic Mobert First Nation ChiNaaknigewin is also unique, in that it requires any request for a constitutional amendment made
to elected Council to be signed by at least twenty-five percent of eligible voters and a majority of
greater than fifty-one percent of twenty-five percent of eligible voters to vote in favour of the
amendment. The Nipissing Gichi-Naaknigewin may be amended with the affirmative vote of
sixty percent of ballots cast, with no imposed ballot minimum.402 Amendments to the
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Atikameksheng Anishnawbek Gchi-Naaknigewin only require a majority of those who attended
the vote to vote favourably, with no imposed minimum.403 The variation in the required voting
thresholds might reflect the level of community participation in past community votes. Lowering
voting thresholds, on the other hand, might have the effect of ensuring the continued growth and
function of the First Nation and act as a defense against apathy or lack of participation.
Dissenters need only vote in the negative. Despite a broad variation in the required level of
assent to constitutional amendments, most processes include a comparable series of referendums
and votes within a standard ninety-day period. The creation of time constraints ensures that
elected government moves forward with the amendment process and that community concerns
regarding amendments are heard without delay.
Power, as a constitutional element, extends to the distribution of authority within
governance. As John Borrows is careful to note, Anishinaabe people did not traditionally allow
their leaders to “accumulate and consolidate power.”404 Although Anishinaabe leadership values
changed over time,405 there was a long-term emphasis on the decentralization of power through
situation-based leadership.406 The protection of individual liberties and the ability of individuals
to contribute their voices are parts of the Anishinaabe constitutional tradition. This is reflected in
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the constitutions’ references to clan-governance,407 restorative justice,408 and the enumerated
rights of individuals.409
The Chippewas of the Thames First Nation, Deshkan Ziibiing Anishinaabe Aki ChiInaakonigewini, is an example of an effort to decentralize local government. A draft document of
the constitution, reviewed by Borrows, referred to five branches of government. Three of those
branches (the General Assembly, Elders, and Youth Council) served only to advise the elected
council in its role. Borrows noted in his review of the document that, while the advisory role of
these councils would help the council to make decisions in a more democratic way, their lack of
accountability, authority also serves to centralize power in a manner that is arguably contrary to
the decentralization of power that is characteristic of traditional Anishinaabeg governance as
well as typical contemporary constitutional governance.410 The ratified document instead
establishes three branches of government: council (the elected governing body), administration
(a body that administers day-to-day operations in accordance with the law and policy of the
community), and a justice system (an “independent branch” of the government that will have the
“power of judicial review and the jurisdiction to interpret and construe the laws, ordinances,
regulations and actions of the other branches of government” under the constitution).411 An
additional article asserts that no branch of the local government may exercise any power
allocated by the constitution to another branch of government, except as specifically authorized
by the constitution itself.412
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Government structure is typically defined in these documents as more centralized than
traditional forms of Anishinaabeg governance (as clan-based and situational), but checks on
government are included as an important component of the balance of power. A common form of
a check on government, familiar in Western administrative law, is the establishment of systems
that provide for the appeal and review of administrative decisions.413 Three of the ten ratified
constitutions and one draft constitution contain articles referring to the establishment of
processes for the review of administrative decisions or laws.414 The inclusion of administrative
law within these constitutions is evidence of an effort within those communities to balance the
powers of elected government, whatever its form, with individual liberties and collective
responsibilities, and to ensure that government operates according to the ideals espoused within
each constitution. The inclusion of these articles is an example of striving toward responsible,
transparent relations.

The Third Element: Justice
Justice is the third and final element of a constitution as outlined by Donald Lutz. Justice
is that which binds together culture and power. The purpose of a constitution is, after all, to
marry power with justice.415 Modern Anishinaabe constitutions reviewed in this study, whether
ratified or draft, serve the purpose of asserting the right of Anishinaabe communities to enact and
oversee the enforcement of laws that the community considers consistent with their traditional
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As in the Chippewas of the Thames First Nation, Deshkan Ziibiing Anishinaabe Aki Chi-Inaakonigewin, ibid at
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values, as well as those contemporary values expressed within their constitutions. The goal is to
govern Anishinaabe lives and futures in Anishinaabe ways. As illustrated in their constitutional
documents, communities are pursuing a number of means of achieving that goal.
One means of pursuing the goal of governing Anishinaabe lives and futures in
Anishinaabe ways is the expressed recognition of the continued legitimacy of clan governance.
Traditional clan governance is recognized in two ratified constitutions (including the overarching
Anishinabek Nation constitution) and two drafted constitutions. In the Anishinaabe ChiNaaknigewin, clan governance is presented as the required foundation of the Anishinabek Nation
government: “The Anishinabek Nation Government shall be based on the Dodemaag system of
governance.”416 Clan governance is not, however, presented as the mandatory form of
organization in all of the community documents. More fluidity is provided in the Deshkan
Ziibiing Anishinaabe Aki Chi-Inaakonigewin: “Deshkan Ziibiing Anishinaabe Aki recognizes the
Dodomaag system of governance in its administration of government and the administration of a
justice system.”417 Recognition of clan governance is given, but adherence is not mandatory.
Clan governance, rather than a requirement, has a place within the governance and
administration of justice.
The draft constitution of Munsee-Delaware Nation, which borders Deshkan Ziibing
(Chippewas of the Thames First Nation), elaborates on the role of traditional dispute resolution
practices in the community: “The Munsee-Delaware Nation may establish any traditional or
restorative justice processes, tribunals, panels, services or courts it deems necessary to provide
for the effective administration and enforcement of its laws and to provide mechanisms for the
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appeal of any of its decisions or laws.”418 The wording does not suggest exactly what those
processes, panels, services or courts may look like, but rather creates a broad category that
allows the community to implement administrative and justice systems as desired.419 Maintaining
recognition of traditional means of governance and justice without confining those systems
creates space for the revitalization of those systems in a context where they have suffered the
harms of attempts to colonize Indigenous peoples.
Traditional Anishinaabe guiding principles are an expression of law in modern
constitutions. Commitments to the seven grandfather420 teachings (Zaagidiwin-Love, DebwewinTruth, Mnaadendmowin-Respect, Nbwaakaawin-Wisdom, Dbaadendiziwin-Humility,
Gwekwaadziwin-Honesty, and Aakedhewin-Bravery)421 are an expression of traditional law.
These teachings, which John Borrows calls “among the most sacred laws and teachings we
have”, are meant to animate Anishinaabe life and should lie at the heart of all action.422 Elder
Fred Kelly calls the seven grandfather teachings “the seven laws of creation”.423 Thus, they are
intertwined with both the culture and power elements of modern Anishinaabe constitutions as
guiding legal principles that are both embedded in distinctive Anishinaabe culture and one of the
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roots of inherent Anishinaabe rights. The seven grandfather teachings are present in both the
preambles and articles of the constitutional documents reviewed for this study. Seven of the ten
ratified constitutions that I reviewed contain explicit references to the seven grandfather
teachings. Though the language varies, a tone of deep respect for the teachings is constant.
Rather than a certain achievement, these teachings are presented as something which community
members (and members of local leadership or government) should strive to embody.
Only four of the ten ratified constitutions424 (and one of five draft constitutions)425
reviewed contain reference to mechanisms of enforcement. Mechanisms to ensure compliance
are not attached to specifically required conduct, but are rather generally included. Enforcement
provisions can be written in general, future-focused terms, such as in the Misswezahging
Debaakinagewin Naakinagewin (“Misswezahging laws will include enforcement provisions
appropriate to the subject matter and the nature of the law”)426 or in terms so specific as to note
the extent of enforcement action, as in article 6.1 of the Wiikwemkoong Gchi-Naaknigewin:
“Wiikwemkoong laws will include enforcement provisions appropriate to the subject matter and
nature of the law and may include sanctions such as banishment from Wiikwemkoong Unceded
Territory. The Wiikwemkoong Gchi-Naakingewin will allow enforcement of these laws by
Police and by Chief and Council.”427 Though still future-focused, the inclusion of a significant
sanction and bodies with jurisdiction of enforcement bares sharper teeth with reference to a
traditional form of punishment.
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The Nipissing Gichi-Naaknigewin and Magnetawan First Nation Gchi-Naaknigewin, a
ratified constitution and draft constitutional document, respectively, frame enforcement as a
matter of ensuring “compliance” and extend their ambit to non-citizens. Both documents assert
that both citizens and “all others who enter the traditional lands” of the community “shall be
obligated to abide by and respect” the laws of the community, which emanate from the
constitutional documents themselves.428 Though no specific enforcement mechanism is
mentioned, the enforcement of law under these constitutions is an asserted right of the First
Nations.429 The right of enforcement is explicitly territorial as it applies to non-citizens visiting
the territory, who are expected to adhere to local law. Mechanisms of enforcement, whether they
are included in articles on ‘enforcement’ or ‘compliance’ remain open to traditional sanctions as
well as Westernized forms of punishment. It is for governance institutions as defined in the
constitution to determine what is appropriate to each law it enacts.
Limits placed on government are those expected in a democratic constitution. The
majority of constitutional documents contain a provision on reasonable limits of governmental
power. The language varies only slightly, with the underlying statement being that the
constitutional document guarantees the rights and freedoms set out within it, subject only to
reasonable limits. Though bodies with the authority to determine those limits are unnamed, the
standard of reasonableness is founded on the collective interests of the ratifying First Nation and
must be demonstrably justified.430 On this point, modern Anishinaaabe constitutions align with
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the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which includes the permissible limitation of
rights if demonstrably justifiable. The prioritization of the interests of the collective when
necessary aligns with traditional law.
There is a need for respected, impartial, and independent bodies to adjudicate
constitutional issues within the framework of modern Anishinaabe constitutions. Though a
number of the constitutions identified contain references to traditional values as a form of
accountability to one’s relations and communities, matters of accountability are lacking in these
documents. It is inevitable that constitutional issues and tensions will arise in communities with
ratified constitutions that identify various constitutional players (such as council, administrators,
citizens), and that some means of managing those disputes fairly and independently must be
devised. This is a point that John Borrows presses in his review of an earlier draft of the Deshkan
Ziibiing Anishinaabe Aki Chi-Inaakonigewin, in which he points to the independence of a dispute
resolution body as “the hallmark of modern constitutional practice”.431
In his recommendations to Chippewas of the Thames First Nation, Borrows advocates for
the establishment of an independent “dispute resolution court” that consists of an elected Chief
Judge. Additional recommendations for the court incorporate term limits for judges, citizenship
requirements, the maintenance of Elders Council consent for Associate Judge appointments, and
the requirement that all judges “have knowledge of Anishinaabe culture, traditions, and general
history, and must uphold the provisions of this Constitution in discharging their duties.”432 This
recommendation, rather than rely on the implicit accountability of one’s commitments to
traditional culture and values, makes a demonstration of those values within a constitutionally
defined independent body mandatory. This gestures to the importance of the inclusion of such
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independent bodies to ensure accountability, not only as a constitutional principle, but in
response to the changing dynamics of governance. As John Borrows explains, Anishinaabe
people traditionally did not allow for leaders to accumulate and consolidate power.433 Leadership
was most often contingent on the situation or task at hand, rather than the particular person, and
was thus often transient.434 A traditional Anishinaabe emphasis on individual autonomy and
decentralization of power435 suggests the importance of the inclusion of respected, independent
adjudicative bodies within a modern Anishinaabe constitutional framework.436
The reasons for a relative absence of impartial, independent adjudicative bodies within
modern Anishinaabe constitutions in Ontario are not addressed in the documents themselves.
One can, however, imagine any number of reasons for this phenomenon. One reason could be
that communities drafting and ratifying constitutions are already subject to the accountability
measures placed on band councils and did not at the time feel it a necessary inclusion. Another
possibility is that some communities may lack the resources and manpower to implement these
structures in the near future. A third reason may lie in the distrust of some for structures that
resemble Canadian institutions because justice initiatives that attempt to combine two different
worldviews have often been seen to fail.437 Whatever the reasons, the absence of such
constitutionally significant bodies is an important critique of modern Anishinaabe
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constitutions.438 Nevertheless, it is important also to recall that these documents, even once
ratified, are a beginning point in constitutional self-government within the identified
communities and their development will continue into the future.

4.5 Conclusion
Constitutionalism is an Anishinaabe legal tradition based on action. As Aaron Mills
explains, these actions are the embodiment of belonging to one another.439 This belonging is
manifested in the written constitutions reviewed in this study in the form of origins, governance,
citizenship, and expectations of conduct. They combine traditional Anishinaabe law and culture
with modern democratic values (and constitutional structures) while maintaining traditional
Anishinaabe legal values of collective cooperation and accountability. Individual rights,
prioritized as part of the collective in Anishinaabe law and generally in Canadian law, must yield
to the preservation of the collective.
The Anishinaabe constitutions I have studied contain more similarities than they do
differences. The majority of these documents make explicit reference to the inherent
responsibility of Anishinaabe people to preserve and protect their language, culture, law, and
ecology for future generations. The right of each First Nation to define its own citizenship is a
key element, while individual rights receive somewhat less attention in view of compared to the
general rights of the Anishinaabe collective. Governance is expected across communities to
respect and adhere to traditional Anishinaabe ways and legal principles while also acting
transparently and with accountability (whether in general governance or financial
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administration). Similarly, these documents contain a comparable absence of constitutionally
entrenched bodies to ensure governmental accountability – a point that may or may not be
developed in the future. Most constitutional documents contain some assertion of inherent rights
based on inward-looking power, while also recognizing outward-looking power. There is not a
single modern Anishinaabe constitutional document in this study that attributes its right to selfdetermination or self-governance to Canadian law, but rather refer to Canadian law (among other
sources) as recognizing those rights. Traditional Anishinaabe law is regularly expressed in the
form of principles, rights, and responsibilities. These constitutional documents are optimistic and
forward-looking as they seek greater control over local affairs and to improve the quality of life
for citizens/members.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
“I am not so concerned with how we dismantle the master's house, that is, which sets of theories we use to
critique colonialism; but I am very concerned with how we (re)build our own house, or our own houses. I
have spent enough time taking down the master's house, and now I want most of my energy to go into
visioning and building our new house.”
- Leanne Simpson, Dancing on Our Turtle’s Back: Stories of Nishnaabeg Re-Creation, Resurgence and a
New Emergence, 2011 440

Whatever the current state of scholarly discussions on the compatibility of Indigenous
law with state law, or on the commensurability/incommensurability of Indigenous law, the
practical reality of the Anishinaabe constitutions deserves to be addressed. Though Aaron Mills
favours a theoretical approach and chooses not to engage with modern Anishinaabe
constitutions, he does make a statement that I believe frames the sentiment behind the production
of these documents: “[t]he unchanging constitution serves as the boundary for perpetual change
in law: a people can both change and stay the same.”441 The intent behind these modern
constitutions, when read as a whole, can be interpreted as an effort to revitalize Anishinaabe law
and to nourish Anishinaabe life as communities look to the future. By ratifying these documents,
communities are meeting members, some of whom may well not have access to traditional forms
of the distribution of law, in the present with an accessible resource that communicates
fundamental principles of the ways that people within the community belong to one another and
their territories, without constraining those ideals to specific, long descriptions. The production

Leanne Simpson, Dancing on Our Turtle’s Back: Stories of Nishnaabeg Re-Creation, Resurgence and a New
Emergence (Winnipeg: Arbeiter Ring Publishing, 2011) at 32.
441
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and ratification of these documents also suggests that some communities are willing to attempt to
translate their law – at least to an extent that might provide for the basic understanding and
respect of outsiders while the law operates in more nuanced ways in communities themselves.
These constitutions are legal instruments, produced and ratified by Anishinaabe
communities in Ontario, that seek to address the contemporary issues faced by First Nations
communities. The form and, to some extent, content of Anishinaabe constitutions suggests that
they are designed to be recognizable as constitutional documents to Western outsiders. And, yet,
they are distinctly Anishinaabe legal instruments. They address these issues from a foundation of
traditional Anishinaabe law and aim to nourish Anishinaabe lifeways while contending with
continued impact of the settler-colonial state on local life. They rely primarily on the authority
derived from Anishinaabe as part of an effort to restore Anishinaabeg jurisdiction, while looking
toward the past, present, and future. Part of a tradition of Anishinaabe constitutionalism, they are
a demonstration of how people belong to one another and to their ecologies.
At this time, the ten ratified constitutions I have studied are in operation outside of a
signed agreement between the Anishinabek Nation and Canada. That means that, for an
indeterminate time, these documents are free-standing constitutions that make claims to selfdetermination and self-governance that overlap with jurisdiction claimed by the Canadian federal
government and the provincial government of Ontario. First Nations members of the
Anishinabek Nation are free to vote ‘no’ to the ANGA, in which case they will remain members
of the organization (unless they withdraw), but not as governing representatives of that
organization. One First Nation with a ratified document examined in this study, Deshkan
Ziibiing (Chippewas of the Thames First Nation), has abandoned that vote altogether, on the
grounds that the proposed umbrella governance agreement is a replication of settler governance
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structures and that the community has already sufficiently outlined its distinctly Anishinaabe
future in its own constitution.442
The continued operation of these constitutions outside of a ratified self-government
agreement443 is only one example of difference between the constitutions studied by Alcantara
and Whitfield and those I have reviewed.444 Despite making similar observations as Alcantara
and Whitfield regarding the uniformity of language on some points, I found that the documents
containing examples of uniform language were in smaller numbers and varied on different
points. For example, the constitutions that contain references to the rights of individuals to access
programs and services offered by the ratifying First Nation are not necessarily the same
constitutions as those requiring the establishment of administrative review processes so as to
balance the power of elected government with individual liberties and constitutional values, such
as transparency. Like Alcantara and Whitfield in their review of West Coast Indigenous
constitutions, I observed a high degree of “first-generation” rights, including rights such as those
to security of the person or freedom of speech. However, where Alcantara and Whitfield
recorded large majorities for many of their points of analysis, I found smaller majorities or
minorities on each point within my own analysis. Despite the guidance provided by the
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Anishinabek Nation to its First Nations members (and despite their consistent form),
Anishinaabe constitutions within Ontario appear to contain more variations than those in the
West Coast study by Alcantara and Whitfield.445 In the case of both of our studies, the
constitutions reviewed do, to some extent, “reflect some of the core constitutional principles of
Canada” while also attempting to “give meaningful life to distinctive local political cultures.” 446
The purpose of this thesis is to shine an empirical light on modern Anishinaabe
constitutions in the context of the movement toward the revitalization of Indigenous law. Though
some variation exists in the sample of ratified and drafted constitutional documents reviewed for
this study, clearly manifest is the commitment to honouring Anishinaabe life. Ratifying First
Nations assert, without exception, their inherent right to self-government or self-determination,
with reference to Canadian law (or other legal sources, such as the UNDRIP) only as a source of
recognition for those inherent rights. In keeping with the discussion of Anishinaabe
constitutionalism in the introduction of this thesis, modern Anishinaabe constitutions look
toward empowering a way of living under the guidance of Anishinaabe law in a modern context.
They seek to limit the powers of elected government and emphasize the rights and
responsibilities of individuals, subject only to the best interests of the collective. A handful of the
constitutions make a concerted effort to balance the power of elected government with individual
liberties. As documents produced in a cooperative effort toward the completion of the
Anishinabek Nation Governance Agreement, modern Anishinaabe constitutions seek renewed
nation-to-nation relationships with Canada. In doing so, they prioritize local constitutional law at
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the First Nations level before the constitution of the Anishinabek Nation and, in at least one case,
the Canadian Constitution.447
The stakes are high for Anishinaabe communities in Ontario that move forward with the
ratification of the ANGA and those who choose not to participate. As noted in Chapter 4.3, the as
yet unratified umbrella agreement is far from a radical change in governance. The restriction of
First Nations governance under Canadian law, its containment of governance to liberal values,
and the prevalence of Canadian law as the state interprets it makes the constitutions reviewed in
this thesis appear in some respects aspirational. For those communities who enter into the
Anishinabek umbrella agreement, their law will undoubtedly be made subject to the dominance
of state law, which shall prevail to the extent of any conflict.448 For those communities who
choose not to participate in the vote, the matter of membership within the Anishinabek Nation
remains a key factor. To decline to vote or ratify a local constitution does not exempt a member
community from the ANGA, but rather makes them non-governing members. Should the ANGA
be ratified, the fate of communities who might choose either to act contrary to the direction of
the Anishinabek Nation or to withdraw their membership is even less clear.449 Within
communities, however, the stakes are no less high. These constitutions are a representation of the
desire of Anishinaabe First Nations communities to revitalize Anishinaabe law and nourish
Anishinaabe life.
Modern Anishinaabe constitutions are a written continuance of traditional Anishinaabe
constitutionalism. They present a coherent expression of culture, power, and justice that,
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according to Lutz, make constitutions worthy of their name.450 These documents, a marriage of
traditional Anishinaabe culture and law with modern democratic principles, are a representation
of the current reality of Anishinaabe communities as they look to the future. Scholars might
debate whether these constitutional documents are a based on tools used originally to build the
Master’s house and, if so, whether such tools can also be used to dismantle that same house.
While this is a theoretically interesting discussion, these modern constitutions will remain a
practical reality of Anishinaabe communities acting in the interest of self-empowerment. As
Leanne Simpson writes in the above epigraph, what matters most is that action is taken now to
build a new house for Indigenous peoples recognizing that we are in a context where the
Canadian state will also endure.
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